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RÉSUMÉ
Cette thèse est composée de trois essais liés à la conception de mécanisme et aux
enchères.
Dans le premier essai j’étudie la conception de mécanismes bayésiens efficaces dans
des environnements où les fonctions d’utilité des agents dépendent de l’alternative choi-
sie même lorsque ceux-ci ne participent pas au mécanisme. En plus d’une règle d’attri-
bution et d’une règle de paiement le planificateur peut proférer des menaces afin d’inciter
les agents à participer au mécanisme et de maximiser son propre surplus ; Le planifica-
teur peut présumer du type d’un agent qui ne participe pas. Je prouve que la solution du
problème de conception peut être trouvée par un choix max-min des types présumés et
des menaces. J’applique ceci à la conception d’une enchère multiple efficace lorsque la
possession du bien par un acheteur a des externalités négatives sur les autres acheteurs.
Le deuxième essai considère la règle du juste retour employée par l’agence spa-
tiale européenne (ESA). Elle assure à chaque état membre un retour proportionnel à
sa contribution, sous forme de contrats attribués à des sociétés venant de cet état. La
règle du juste retour est en conflit avec le principe de la libre concurrence puisque des
contrats ne sont pas nécessairement attribués aux sociétés qui font les offres les plus
basses. Ceci a soulevé des discussions sur l’utilisation de cette règle : les grands états
ayant des programmes spatiaux nationaux forts, voient sa stricte utilisation comme un
obstacle à la compétitivité et à la rentabilité. Apriori cette règle semble plus coûteuse
à l’agence que les enchères traditionnelles. Nous prouvons au contraire qu’une implé-
mentation appropriée de la règle du juste retour peut la rendre moins coûteuse que des
enchères traditionnelles de libre concurrence. Nous considérons le cas de l’information
complète où les niveaux de technologie des firmes sont de notoriété publique, et le cas de
l’information incomplète où les sociétés observent en privée leurs coûts de production.
Enfin, dans le troisième essai je dérive un mécanisme optimal d’appel d’offre dans un
environnement où un acheteur d’articles hétérogènes fait face a de potentiels fournisseurs
de différents groupes, et est contraint de choisir une liste de gagnants qui est compatible
avec des quotas assignés aux différents groupes. La règle optimale d’attribution consiste
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à assigner des niveaux de priorité aux fournisseurs sur la base des coûts individuels
qu’ils rapportent au décideur. La manière dont ces niveaux de priorité sont déterminés
est subjective mais connue de tous avant le déroulement de l’appel d’offre. Les différents
coûts rapportés induisent des scores pour chaque liste potentielle de gagnant. Les articles
sont alors achetés à la liste ayant les meilleurs scores, s’il n’est pas plus grand que la
valeur de l’acheteur. Je montre également qu’en général il n’est pas optimal d’acheter
les articles par des enchères séparées.
Mots clés: efficacité, options extérieures endogènes, menaces, coûts virtuels, op-
timalité, juste retour, libre concurrence, asymétrie, enchère.
ABSTRACT
This thesis is made of three essays related to mechanism design and auctions.
In first essay I study Bayesian efficient mechanism design in environments where
agents’ utility functions depend on the chosen alternative even if they do not participate
to the mechanism. In addition to an allocation rule and a payment rule the designer may
choose appropriate threats in order to give agents the incentive to participate and maxi-
mize his own expected surplus ; The planner may presume the type of an agent who does
not participate. I show that the solution of the design problem can be found by a max -
min choice of the presumed types and threats. I apply this to the design of an efficient
multi-unit auction when a buyer in possession of the good causes negative externalities
on other buyers.
The second essay considers the fair return rule used by the European Space Agency
(ESA). It ensures each member state of ESA a return proportional to its contribution, in
the form of contracts awarded to firms coming from that state. The fair return rule is in
conflict with the principle of free competition since contracts are not necessarily awarded
to firms with the lowest bids. This has raised debates on the use of this rule : it is well ac-
cepted by small states, but larger states with strong national space programs, see its strict
use as an obstacle to competitiveness and cost effectiveness. It is easy to believe that
this rule is more costly to the agency than traditional auctions. We show on the contrary
that an adequate implementation of the fair return rule may cause it to be less expensive
to the agency than the traditional auctions of free competition. We consider the case of
complete information where firms’ technology levels are common knowledge, and the
case of incomplete information where firms observe privately their production costs. In
both cases we show that adequate implementation of the fair return rule may help take
advantage of asymmetries between countries in order to expect a lower cost than with
traditional auctions.
Finally, in the third essay I derive an optimal procurement mechanism in an environment
where a buyer of heterogeneous items faces potential suppliers from different groups,
and is constrained to choose a winning list that is consistent with some exogenous quo-
vi
tas assigned to the different groups. The optimal allocation rule consists of assigning
priority levels to suppliers on the basis of their cost reports. The way these priority levels
are determined is subjective but known to all before the auction. The individual reports
induce scores for each potential winning list. The items are then purchased from one of
the lists with the best score, provided it is not greater than the buyer’s valuation for the
items. I also find that it is not optimal to purchase the items through separate auctions,
unless the buyer’s valuation is sufficiently high or low.
Keywords : efficiency, endogenous outside options, threats, Optimal, Virtual
costs,fair return, free competition, asymmetry, auction.
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INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE
Prendre une décision quand plusieurs agents font face à des alternatives les affectant
différemment est un problème habituellement résolu par l’exécution d’un mécanisme.
C’est à dire un ensemble de règles déterminant, sur la base d’informations recueillies
auprès des agents (appelées leurs types), quelle alternative sera choisie et éventuellement
quels doivent être les paiements à faire ou à recevoir par chaque agent. Des exemples de
mécanismes incluent des enchères et des règles de vote. Les agents sont habituellement
libres de décider s’ils participeront au mécanisme ou pas. Différentes règles seront em-
ployées selon l’objectif visé par le décideur et selon le contexte dans lequel la décision
doit être prise. Les deux objectifs les plus communs sont la maximisation du revenu et
l’efficacité sociale. Ces deux objectifs sont en général opposés dans un contexte d’infor-
mation incomplète. Comme discipline, la conception de mécanismes vise à formaliser
la création et l’exécution de règles appropriées étant donnés un certain objectif et un
environnement particulier. Cette thèse est faite de trois essais liés à la conception de mé-
canismes avec des applications aux enchères. Les essais diffèrent par l’environnement et
par l’objectif du décideur.
Dans la majeure partie de la littérature sur la conception de mécanismes on suppose
habituellement que les agents qui ne participent pas au mécanisme ont des options ex-
térieures qui sont indépendantes de l’issue du mécanisme. Cependant dans la pratique
les agents qui ne participent pas sont néanmoins concernés par l’alternative finalement
choisie par les autres. Par exemple, si un gouvernement veut vendre un permis pour une
innovation technologique la société qui obtient le permis exercera des externalités néga-
tives sur les autres sociétés. En fait, qu’une société participe ou pas, sa part du marché
est susceptible de diminuer suite au fait que le permis est vendu à un concurrent. le pre-
mier essai étudie la conception de mécanismes efficaces dans des environnements où les
agents ont des informations privées et ont des options extérieures endogènes. C’est à dire
que leurs fonctions d’utilité dépendent de l’alternative choisie même si ils ne participent
pas au mécanisme. La décision appartient à un planificateur qui, en plus de viser l’effi-
cacité sociale, veut maximiser l’espérance du surplus collecté lors des transfert avec les
2agents, tout en cherchant à induire une participation honnête de tous les agents. Krishna
et Perry (2000) ont généralisé les mécanismes VCG en introduisant le concept de la base.
Dans leur théorème 1 ils prouvent qu’un choix approprié de la base permet d’obtenir un
mécanisme qui maximise le paiement de chaque agent, et par conséquent le surplus es-
péré du planificateur, parmi les mécanismes efficaces qui induisent la participation hon-
nête. Leur modèle cependant ne prend pas en considération des environnements où les
options extérieures sont endogènes comme c’est le cas dans cet essai. Jehiel et al (1996)
ont prouvé que les options extérieures endogènes donnent au planificateur un outil addi-
tionnel pour augmenter son surplus espéré et pour induire la participation des agents : le
planificateur peut décider comment punir un agent qui décide de ne pas participer. Dans
ce contexte un mécanisme implique la description d’une règle d’attribution qui déter-
mine l’alternative qui sera choisie si tous les agents participent, une règle de paiement,
mais également “une menace” pour chaque agent au cas où il ne participerait pas.
Je combine les approches de Krishna et Perry (2000) et de Jehiel et autres (1996)
pour concevoir un mécanisme qui maximise le surplus espéré (revenu) du concepteur
parmi les mécanismes efficaces induisant la participation honnête de tous. Je considère
une classe de mécanismes VCG plus large que celle de Krishna et de Perry (2000), et
j’utilise des hypothèses moins fortes. Les mécanismes VCG sont désormais caractérisés
non seulement par une base mais également par des menaces. Je prouve qu’un choix
approprié de type max-min de la base et des menaces maximise le surplus espéré du pla-
nificateur parmi les mécanismes efficaces induisant la participation honnête. Je fournis
un résultat d’existence pour des fonctions d’utilité extérieures pouvant être décomposées
en deux composantes additives : une composante exogène et une composante endogène.
J’applique alors ces résultats pour concevoir une enchère multiple efficace dans un envi-
ronnement où un acheteur en possession du bien cause des externalités négatives sur les
autres agents.
Dans la littérature liée à la conception de mécanismes avec des options extérieures
endogènes, l’analyse s’est concentrée sur les ventes et sur la maximisation de revenu
comme premier objectif. Le mécanisme optimal s’avère souvent inefficace (excepté dans
le cas de l’information complète Jehiel et autres (1996)). Jehiel et autres (1996) travaille
3aussi en information incomplète mais pas avec des options extérieures qui dépendent du
type des agents. Figueroa et Skreta (2009) considèrent un modèle avec des options ex-
térieures dépendantes du type des agents ; ils prouvent que quelques fois le mécanisme
maximisant le revenu est efficace et d’autres fois il n’est pas efficace. Dans cet essai
l’efficacité est plus importante que la maximisation du revenu (le surplus) : l’objectif de
revenu est limité aux mécanismes efficaces seulement. Cependant les deux approches se
rencontrent chaque fois que le mécanisme maximisant le revenu est efficace. Une intui-
tion qui nous vient de cette littérature est que le planificateur menacerait de minimiser
l’utilité d’un agent qui ne participe pas par ce que son option extérieure est une limite
potentielle au surplus du décideur ; cependant il peut induire la participation des agents
en tendant à réduire leurs paiements s’ils participent au mécanisme. C’est la conjonction
de ces deux forces qui mène au choix de type max-min de la base et des menaces dans
mon modèle. D’ailleurs dans ce cadre la base peut être interprétée comme types pré-
sumés des agents quand ils ne participent pas et donc ne signale pas directement leurs
types privés au planificateur.
Dans le deuxième essai nous considérons la règle du juste retour. Les appels d’offre
de l’agence spatiale européenne (ASE) sont sujets à cette règle. La règle du juste retour
assure à chaque état membre un retour proportionnel à sa contribution, sous forme de
contrats attribués aux sociétés venant de cet état. Autrement dit les projets de l’ASE sont
divisés en plus petits projets de sorte que les sociétés de tailles différentes et provenant
des différents états membres puissent y participer. Un avantage de cette règle est que les
sociétés ont l’occasion de partager leurs expériences, leur connaissances scientifiques et
leurs technologies. Un autre avantage est d’inciter les états membres à contribuer aux
activités de l’ASE. Dans la pratique la règle du juste retour est mise en application de
sorte que le rapport entre la part d’un état en valeurs des contrats et sa contribution finan-
cière aux projets de l’agence ne soit pas inférieur à un seuil (le taux de retour). Quand
ce seuil est 0.98 par exemple, une contribution de 1 euro garanti à un état au moins 0.98
euro sous forme de contrats a attribuer à des sociétés de cet état. Dans le meilleur des cas
le taux de retour devrait être égal à 1. À côté de la règle du juste retour, l’ASE cherche
également à favoriser la libre concurrence chaque fois que les deux principes ne sont pas
4en contradiction. La conception traditionnelle de la libre concurrence consiste à assigner
des contrats aux sociétés qui font les plus basses offres indépendamment de leurs ori-
gines. L’exécution de la règle du juste retour requiert une période relativement longue
(5 ans) à l’issue de laquelle chaque état membre devrait avoir un taux de retour dans les
normes ; car il est pratiquement impossible d’assurer à chaque état membre un retour
égal à sa contribution à tout moment ou à l’issue de chaque enchère. En bref, l’ASE
applique la libre concurrence autant que possible et une révision est constamment faite
afin d’ajuster les taux de retour si nécessaire. Ceci est fait en appliquant quelques règles
particulières d’attribution dans les enchères restantes selon les taux de retour courant.
Il y a eu bien des discussions sur l’utilisation de la règle du juste retour. Elle est plutôt
acceptée par les petits états mais les états possédant des programmes spatiaux nationaux
forts, voient dans son utilisation stricte un obstacle à la compétitivité et à la rentabilité.
En outre, l’ASE et le Communauté Européenne travaillent ensemble afin de déterminer
une politique spatiale européenne. Dans ce nouveau rapport, la question de la règle du
juste retour est également discutée puisque le Communauté Européenne emploie une
politique industrielle différente.
L’utilisation du juste retour a généré beaucoup de questions ; ce deuxième essai
contribue à répondre à la suivante : les enchères traditionnelles sont-elles moins coû-
teuses pour l’ASE que la règle du juste retour ? Cette question résulte du fait que la
règle du juste retour est (socialement) inefficace, dans le sens où la société ayant la plus
basse offre ne gagne pas nécessairement le contrat. Nous faisons un premier pas dans
l’analyse de cette question en utilisant un modèle réduit où un acheteur (ASE) cherche
à acheter plusieurs articles à des fournisseurs potentiels (sociétés) de diverses origines
(états membre de l’ASE). L’agence peut mettre en application la règle du juste retour ou
la libre concurrence. Sous la libre concurrence, des contrats pour la fourniture de chaque
article sont attribués indépendamment et les gagnants sont les meilleurs soumission-
naires (ceux avec les plus basses offres). Quoique la règle du juste retour soit dynamique
dans son exécution, dans cet essai, nous en adoptons une version statique afin de garder
les choses simples : selon la règle du juste retour les contrats sont attribués de sorte que
tous les états membres soient représentés par les fournisseurs réels. Il est important de
5noter qu’une version dynamique de la règle du juste retour est faite en réalité d’une suite
d’enchères statiques semblables à celle que nous adoptons ici mais différentes aussi par
le nombre d’états réellement impliqués dans chaque enchère. Dans la pratique la priorité
est accordée à certains états membres selon les taux de retour courants. Lorsque les taux
de retour varient la priorité change. Nous considérons le cas de l’information complète
où les niveaux de technologie des sociétés sont de notoriété publique, et le cas de l’in-
formation incomplète où les sociétés observent en privé leurs coûts de production. De
même qu’il y a une multitude d’enchères qui assigneraient les contrats aux meilleurs
soumissionnaires (ex. enchères au premier et deuxième prix), il y a plusieurs enchères
possibles qui pour satisfaire la règle du juste retour. La plus évidente permettrait d’as-
signer les contrats à une équipe composée de sociétés venant de tous les états ayant la
meilleure offre agrégée. Nous appelons cette enchère FR et la comparons à l’enchère
de premier prix dans le cas de l’information complète. Dans le cadre de l’information
incomplète nous concevons une enchère dans le genre de l’enchère de deuxième prix
et comparons ce format d’enchère (appelé l’enchère SFR) à l’enchère de deuxième prix
justement.
En présence d’asymétrie technologique, le conflit entre les petits et grands états peut
être illustré comme suit : imaginez une situation où les fournisseurs de l’état l ont des
coûts inférieurs pour la production des articles en comparaison avec leurs adversaires de
l’état h ; sous l’enchère de premier prix les articles sont uniquement achetés des four-
nisseurs de l puisqu’ils ont plus de latitude à faire de basses offres. Par conséquent les
fournisseurs de l’état h préféreront l’enchère FR à l’enchère de premier prix, contrai-
rement aux fournisseurs de l’état l. D’ailleurs dans un tel contexte il est clair que, si
les fournisseurs font les mêmes offres indépendamment de la politique industrielle uti-
lisée, l’agence payerait un prix plus élevé sous l’enchère FR que sous des enchères des
premiers prix. Plus généralement, même sans l’hypothèse d’asymétrie, nous pouvons
parvenir à cette conclusion. En effet, sous des enchères de premier prix les contrats
sont attribués aux plus bas soumissionnaires à un prix égal à ces offres ; mais sous l’en-
chère FR, les contrats sont attribués à un ensemble de fournisseurs avec la plus basse
offre agrégée ; puisque certains fournisseurs de l’équipe gagnante peuvent ne pas avoir
6la plus basse offre de leur catégorie, le prix payé par l’agence sous l’enchère FR est
plus élevé. Ceci étant, une réponse affirmative à la question initiale peut sembler évi-
dente. Cependant, même si l’argument précédent est vrai, il repose sur l’hypothèse que
les fournisseurs feraient les mêmes offres peu importe l’enchère en vigueur, ce qui n’est
pas forcément le cas. En fait les offres des fournisseurs ne sont que le résultat de leurs
différentes stratégies et, celles ci peuvent changer si les règles changent. Nous montrons
que la libre concurrence peut parfois être plus coûteuse que la règle du juste retour. En
particulier, et contrairement à l’argument précédent et à la première intuition, nous prou-
vons que ceci se produit souvent quand les fournisseurs d’un état donné sont chacun
plus compétitifs que leur adversaire direct de l’autre état. Dans de telles conditions l’un
des états possède un avantage technologique par rapport à l’autre dans la production
de chaque article. L’intuition : selon la règle du juste retour, puisque les fournisseurs
du même état ne peuvent pas gagner simultanément, un fournisseur compétitif est en
concurrence non seulement avec le fournisseur du même article mais également avec le
fournisseur du même état. Une situation qui force les fournisseurs compétitifs à être plus
agressifs dans leurs offres sous la règle du juste retour que sous la libre concurrence, et
résulte en un prix plus élevé pour l’agence.
Le dernier essai étudie la conception d’un mécanisme optimal pour un acheteur vou-
lant acheter des articles hétérogènes et faisant face à des fournisseurs potentiels appar-
tenant à différents groupes. Chaque fournisseur peut uniquement fournir un des articles.
Les articles sont des compléments et l’acheteur désire les acheter en utilisant un méca-
nisme d’achat optimal c’est-à-dire, un mécanisme qui maximise son surplus. En outre
l’acheteur fait face à la contrainte suivante : à chaque groupe d’agent est assigné des
quotas déterminant le nombre maximal et minimal d’articles à acheter des fournisseurs
de ce groupe. En parallèle, nous sommes également concernés par le mécanisme optimal
quand l’acheteur n’est pas contraint.
Ce modèle pourrait s’appliquer aux deux exemples suivants. Tout d’abord, consi-
dérons un organisme gouvernemental désirant réaliser un projet divisé en sous-projets.
Des contrats reliés à ces sous-projets sont attribués à des agents par le moyen d’un appel
d’offre. Supposons que les participants sont des chercheurs de différentes provinces du
7pays. Un gouvernement voulant encourager la recherche dans toutes les provinces peut
concevoir un mécanisme d’appel d’offre tel que les gagnants proviennent de toutes les
provinces. Si l’agence attribue chaque contrat aux chercheurs qui font les plus basses
offres, il y a des chances que les gagnants ne viendront pas de toutes les provinces. Quel
mécanisme d’attribution l’agence devrait-elle choisir afin d’attribuer les contrats ? En
second lieu, supposons qu’une institution internationale a plusieurs postes à remplir et
fait face à des candidats venant de différents états. Si l’établissement est financé par ces
états, alors l’établissement peut vouloir recruter de tous ces pays dans le but de favoriser
l’intégration des différents états. Comment le processus de recrutement devrait-il être
conduit ?
Revenant au modèle, on suppose que des fournisseurs ont des informations privées
sur leurs coûts d’approvisionnement (coût d’accomplissement de la tâche dans le cas
d’un recrutement) et ces coûts sont indépendants les uns des autres. Nous limitons notre
attention aux mécanismes directs. Il s’agit de mécanismes dans lesquels chaque four-
nisseur est tenu de soumettre son information à l’acheteur avant que celui ci ne prenne
sa décision. Sous de tels mécanismes, étant donné que les coûts sont connus de façon
privée, les fournisseurs peuvent donner une fausse information sur leurs coûts s’il le juge
avantageux. Nous nous intéressons aux mécanismes d’incitation c’est-à-dire, des méca-
nismes dans lesquels c’est un équilibre de rapporter honnêtement l’information privée.
En outre nous nous concentrons sur des mécanismes satisfaisant la contrainte de partici-
pation : ce sont des mécanismes dans lesquels chaque fournisseur qui participe à l’appel
d’offre s’attend à un bénéfice au moins égal à ce qu’il obtient s’il ne participe pas.
Nous généralisons les techniques de Myerson (1981) afin de d’obtenir un mécanisme
optimal. Comme dans Myerson (1981) l’acheteur peut refuser d’acheter les articles s’il
ne le juge pas avantageux. Branco (1996) caractérise l’enchère multiple optimale dans
le cas d’articles homogènes, en revanche nous avons un modèle avec des articles hétéro-
gènes. Des enchères multiples optimales avec des articles hétérogènes ont été largement
étudiées. Dans ce type d’environnements chaque soumissionnaire peut habituellement
faire concurrence pour plus d’un article. Un thème récurrent dans ces papiers est la
question d’acheter les articles par paquets ou par plusieurs enchères séquentielles. Arm-
8strong (2000), Jehiel et moldovanu (2001) ont montré que l’empaquetement est optimal
dans le cas de deux articles. Levin (1997) a étudié l’enchère optimale pour des com-
pléments et a prouvé qu’il est avantageux d’empaqueter. Une autre question importante
est la dimension des informations disponibles aux soumissionnaires (leur type). La ma-
jeure partie de la littérature sur les enchères multiples optimales suppose que les types
sont multidimensionnels et discrets (Armstrong 2000, Avery et Hendershott 2000). Nous
considérons plutôt des types unidimensionnels et continus (les coûts unitaire des four-
nisseurs). Tous ces papiers ne considèrent pas des environnement où la liste des gagnants
doit respecter des quotas pour chaque groupe de fournisseurs : le sujet de cet essai. Nous
ne permettons pas aux fournisseurs d’offrir plus d’un article. Mais le fait que l’acheteur
regarde les articles comme des compléments suggère la possibilité de les acheter dans
une enchère commune. D’ailleurs la présence d’une contrainte qui assigne différentes
quotas aux groupes de fournisseurs semble aussi en faveur d’une enchère commune.
Naturellement il est possible d’acheter les articles dans un mécanisme se composant de
beaucoup d’enchères séparées : nous appelons ce type de mécanismes “itemwise”. Nous
trouvons une condition nécessaire pour qu’un mécanisme itemwise soit optimal.
CHAPITRE 1
OPTIMAL THREATS AND EFFICIENT MECHANISM DESIGN
Abstract
This paper studies Bayesian efficient mechanism design in environments where agents’
utility functions depend on the chosen alternative even if they do not participate to the
mechanism. In addition to an allocation rule and a payment rule the designer may choose
appropriate threats in order to give agents the incentive to participate and maximize his
own expected surplus. The planner may presume the type of an agent who does not par-
ticipate. I show that the solution of the design problem can be found by a maxmin choice
of the presumed types and threats. I apply this to the design of an efficient multi-unit
auction when a buyer in possession of the good causes negative externalities on other
buyers.
1.1 Introduction
The problem of reaching a decision when a group of agents faces many alternatives
affecting them differently is usually solved by the implementation of a mechanism. That
is, a set of rules allowing to determine, on the basis of some information gathered from
the agents (their types), which alternative will be chosen and what are the payments each
agent is to make or receive. Examples of mechanisms include voting schemes and auc-
tions. Agents are free to decide if they will participate to the mechanism. In most of the
literature on mechanism design it is usually assumed that agents who do not participate
to the mechanism have outside options that are independent of the outcome of the me-
chanism. 1In some applications however agents who do not participate are still concerned
by the chosen alternative. For example, if a government wants to sell a license for a tech-
nological innovation the winning firm will exert negative externality on the other firms.
In fact whether a firm participates or not, its share in the market is likely to decrease as a
1. For a review on mechanism design see Jackson (2001) or Myerson (2006).
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result of the license being sold to a competitor. The siting of noxious facilities is another
example. In this problem agents have to decide who among them will be the host. The
agents are concerned by the decision, whether they participate or not to the mechanism,
if their utility functions depend on their distance to the site (see Ingberman 1995).
Outside options are said endogenous if the utility functions of agents who do not
participate to the mechanism still depend on the chosen alternative. This paper studies
efficient mechanism design in environments in which agents are privately informed and
have endogenous outside options. The decision belongs to a planner who, beside the
objective of efficiency, wants to maximize his own expected surplus and at the same
time induce truthful participation of all agents.
Krishna and Perry (2000) generalize the VCG mechanisms by introducing a notion
of basis. In their Theorem 1 they show that an appropriate choice of the basis results in a
mechanism that maximizes the payment of each agent, and hence the expected surplus of
the planner, among efficient mechanisms that induce truthful participation. Their model
however does not take into account environments where outside options are endogenous
as is the case in this paper. As shown in Jehiel et al (1996) endogenous outside options
put in the planner’s hand an additional tool to increase his expected surplus and induce
the participation of the agents : the planner can decide what to do if a given agent decides
to not participate. Thus a mechanism involves the description of an allocation rule which
determines the alternative that will be chosen if all agents participate, a payment rule but
also a sequence of “threats” to each agent in case he does not participate. I combine the
approaches of Krishna and Perry (2000) and Jehiel et al (1996) to solve the announced
problem. The class of VCG mechanisms I consider involves not only a basis but also
threats.
I show that an appropriate maxmin choice of the basis and threats would maximize
the expected surplus of the planner among efficient mechanisms inducing truthful par-
ticipation. I provide an existence result for outside utility that may be decomposed into
two additive components : an exogenous component and an endogenous component.
I then apply these results to design an efficient multiunit auction for environments in
which a buyer in possession of the good causes negative externalities on other buyers.
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I show that a generalization of the Vickrey auction (see Vickrey 1961) maximizes the
surplus among efficient mechanisms inducing truthful participation.
Weaker assumptions than those in Krishna and Perry (2000) are made. I do not res-
trict the study to convex type spaces, nor do I assume that the distributions of the payoff
vectors are absolutely continuous. In particular, these assumptions would reduce the set
of efficient allocation rules to a “singleton” as is suggested by the argument for theorem
1 in Krishna and Perry (2000) and is explicitly mentioned in Krishna (2002). Instead I
directly assume that the “revenue equivalence” property holds and rely on the literature
for much weaker sufficient conditions. The results of this paper thus generalize Krishna
and Perry (2000).
In the literature of mechanism design with endogenous outside options the analy-
sis has focused on sales and on revenue maximization as a primary objective (See, for
instance, Jehiel et al 1996, Jehiel et al 1999, Figueroa and Skreta 2009). The optimal
mechanism is often inefficient. Jehiel et al (1996) show that the optimal mechanism is
efficient in the case of complete information. They also determine the optimal mecha-
nism under incomplete information and show that it is inefficient. Their model does not
allow the outside options of agents to depend on their own type. Figueroa and Skreta
(2009) do consider a model with type dependent outside options and show that some-
times the revenue maximizing mechanism is efficient and other times it is not efficient. In
the present paper efficiency is more important than revenue (surplus) maximization : the
revenue objective is limited to efficient mechanisms only. Clearly, the two approaches
meet whenever the revenue maximizing mechanism is efficient. An intuition that comes
from this literature is that the planner would threaten to lower the utility of an agent who
does not participate because his outside option is a potential limit to the planner’s surplus
(or revenue). However the planner can induce the participation of the agents by tending
to reduce their payments if they participate to the mechanism. It is the conjunction of
these two forces that leads to the maxmin choice of the basis and threats in my model.
Moreover in this framework the basis may be interpreted as the presumed types of the
agents when they do not participate and therefore do not reveal their private types to the
planner.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follow : the next section describes the mo-
del and presents a formal statement of the problem. Section 3 introduces the class of
VCG mechanisms and shows that VCG mechanism maximizes the expected surplus of
the planner among efficient mechanisms inducing truthful participation of all agents.
In section 4, the case of outside utility with endogenous and/or exogenous components
is studied. Section 5 presents an application to multi-unit auction design with negative
externalities. Section 6 concludes the paper.
1.2 The model
There is a planner who wants to choose among many alternatives. The set of alter-
natives is denoted A and is finite. There is a set of agentsN ={1,2, ...,n} whose utility
funcitons depend on the chosen alternative. Agent i’s type is denoted ti and is a random
variable having values in the measurable space (Ti,Ti) and with a probability image de-
noted pi. Denote T = ×
i∈N
Ti andT = ⊗
i∈N
Ti . The common prior is the product measure
p = ×
i∈N
pi. Thus types are independently distributed. Each agent observes privately his
own type. I will use the notation EY (t) for the expectation of the random variable Y (t)
and E−iY (t) for the expectation of Y (t) taken over t−i. Agent i’s utility when alternative a
is chosen is vi(a, ti)− zi, where zi is the payment made by the agent. Assume that vi(a, .)
is integrable for any a ∈ A.
Hereafter we shall denote ∆(B) the set of probabilities over a finite set B.
An allocation rule is a measurable function q = (qa)a∈A : T→∆(A); qa(t) is the pro-
bability that alternative a is chosen. A payment rule is an integrable function µ : T→Rn
where µi(t) is the payment made by agent i. A threat to agent i is a measurable function
ρ i : (T−i,T−i)→∆(A−i), where T−i = ×
j 6=i
Tj , T−i = ⊗
j 6=i
T j and A−i ⊂ A denotes the set of
available alternatives when agent i does not participate. ρ ia(t−i) represents the probability
that alternative a be chosen when agent i does not participate and the other agents report
a type vector t−i. I shall use the notation ρ = (ρ i)i∈N . I also denote Mi the set of threats
to agent i.
By the revelation principle I may focus on direct mechanisms. That is, mechanisms
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under which agents are asked to report their private information prior to the planner’s
decision. Formally a direct mechanism is a triplet (q,µ,ρ). If several agents do not par-
ticipate to the mechanism the planner chooses any alternative. However this choice is
irrelevant in the subsequent analysis since I am studying mechanisms that induce parti-
cipation of all agents.
An allocation rule qe is (ex post) efficient if for every type t ∈ T,
qe(t) ∈ arg max
qε∆(A)
∑
i∈N
∑
a∈A
vi(a, ti)qa. (1.1)
I shall denote by E the set of efficient allocation rules. An efficient allocation rule
chooses the most (socially) valued alternative. A mechanism is incentive compatible (IC)
if reporting his type honestly maximizes the expected utility of an agent when the other
agents are also honest.
Agent i’s expected utility when he reports the type ri and his true type is ti, is given
by :
ui(ri, ti;q,µ) = E−i
{
∑
a∈A
vi(a, ti)qa(ri, t−i)−µi(ri, t−i)
}
. (1.2)
Therefore a mechanism is IC if
ui(ri, ti;q,µ)≤ ui(ti, ti;q,µ)≡Ui(ti;q,µ). (1.3)
Denote wi(a, t) the utility of agent i if he does not participate to the mechanism and
alternative a is chosen. I allow the non participation utility of each agent to depend on
his own type and on other agents’ types, and to be different from participation payoffs.
This assumptions may be justified by the fact that the current mechanism is not the
only source of utility (or disutility) for agents. This assumption is a departure from the
literature on mechanisms with endogenous outside options in which equality between
participation payoffs and outside utility is generally assumed. In the present model this
would correspond to the case of “purely endogenous outside options” : wi(a, t)= vi(a, ti).
The expected utility of agent i if he does not participate (or simply his outside option)
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is given by the formula :
IRi(ti;ρ i) = E−i ∑
a∈A−i
ρ ia(t−i)wi(a, t). (1.4)
When wi(a, t) is independent of ti the outside option is type independent : IRi =
IRi(ρ i). And if wi(a, t) is independent of a the outside option is independent of the
threat : IRi = IRi(ti). This last case corresponds to the situation where outside options
are exogenous.
A mechanism is individually rational (IR) if Ui(ti;q,µ) ≥ IRi(ti;ρ i) for any i ∈N
and ti ∈ Ti. That is, the expected utility if an agent participates truthfully is at least equal
to his outside option.
The surplus of the planner is the sum of agents’ payments. The planner’s objective
is to design a mechanism that maximizes his expected surplus among efficient, IC and
IR mechanisms.
The revenue equivalence property is satisfied if for any pair (q,µ,ρ) and (q,µ ′,ρ)
of IC mechanisms, E−iµi(ti, t−i)−E−iµ ′i (ti, t−i) does not depend on ti.
Throughout this paper I assume that the revenue equivalence property is satisfied.
There is an important literature on sufficient conditions for the revenue equivalence pro-
perty 2. The sufficient conditions in Chung and Olszewski (2007) allow for type sets that
may not be connected or bounded as well as prior that may not be absolutely continuous.
Though they do not consider environments in which outside options are endogenous their
result applies to this case provided the outside allocation rules are fixed, as is the case in
the previous definition of the revenue equivalence property.
1.3 VCG mechanisms as surplus maximizing mechanism
1.3.1 Definition
Given an efficient allocation rule q, one may define the following functions :
2. See, for instance, Krishna and Maenner (2001), Milgrom and Segal (2002), Heydenreich et al
(2007).
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SW (t;q) = ∑
i∈N
∑
a∈A
vi(a, ti)qa(t) (1.5)
SWi(t;q) = ∑
a∈A
vi(a, ti)qa(t) (1.6)
SW−i(t;q) = SW (t;q)−SWi(t;q) (1.7)
SW (t;q) is the social welfare if the planner implements the allocation rule q when
the vector of types is t. It is the sum of all the agents utility and the planner’s surplus, i.e.
the sum of expected payoffs of the agents. SWi(t;q) represents the payoff of agent i and
SW−i(t;q) is the payoff of all agents but i. Note that SW is independent of q (for efficient
allocation rules) but this is not true for SWi or SW−i.
Given an allocation rule and a profile of types s = (si)i∈N one may define the pay-
ment rule m(.;q,ρ|s) by :
mi(t;q,ρ|s) = SW (si, t−i)−SW−i(t;q)− IRi(si;ρ i). (1.8)
Using the fact that SW (si, t−i) = SWi(si, t−i)+ SW−i(si, t−i) we see that, under this
payment rule, agent i is asked to pay the externality (SW−i(si, t−i)−SW−i(t;q)) he causes
on the other agents by revealing a type ti when his true type is si, and also his gain
(SWi(si, t−i;q)− IRi(si;ρ i)) from participating (truthfully) to the mechanism when his
type is si. It would be helpful to understand si as agent i’s presumed type if he does not
participate to the mechanism (agents’ types are private information, thus if they do not
participate the planner can only presume their types).
Given an efficient allocation rule q and an outside allocation rule ρ , the mechanism
(q,m(.;q,ρ|s),ρ) is called a VCG mechanism with basis s and threats ρ . Hereafter I use
the simpler notation (q,s,ρ) to denote the mechanism (q,m(.;q,ρ|s),ρ). The planner
has the choice of ρ and s as well as q, and his choice is publicly declared prior to the
implementation of the mechanism.
Due to the assumptions in this paper the efficient allocation rules may not be equal
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almost surely contrary to Krishna and Perry (2000). Thus, there are possibly many VCG
mechanisms with the same basis s and threats ρ . Moreover because SW−i(t;q) is sen-
sitive to the allocation rule so is agent i’s payment mi(t;q,ρ|s) ; two allocation rules,
different with positive probability, will give the same agent different expected payments
under VCG mechanisms with the same basis and threats.
1.3.2 Properties of VCG mechanisms
By definition a VCG mechanism is efficient. This section shows that VCG mecha-
nisms are incentive compatible and characterizes those that are individually rational.
Lemma 1. VCG mechanisms are IC. 3
Proof. Indeed,{
∑
a∈A
vi(a, ti)qa(ri, t−i)−mi(ri, t−i;q,ρ|s)
}
= ∑
a∈A
vi(a, ti)qa(ri, t−i)+SW−i(ri, t−i;q)−SW (si, t−i)+ IRi(si;ρ i)
≤ SW (ti, t−i)−SW (si, t−i)+ IRi(si;ρ i)
=
{
∑
a∈A
vi(a, ti)qa(ti, t−i)−mi(ti, t−i;q,ρ|s)
}
therefore
E−i
{
∑
a∈A
vi(a, ti)qa(ri, t−i)−mi(ri, t−i;q,ρ|s)
}
≤E−i
{
∑
a∈A
vi(a, ti)qa(ti, t−i)−mi(ti, t−i;q,ρ|s)
}
.
The expected equilibrium utility of agent i is given by :
Ui(ti;si,ρ i) = E−i
[
SW (t)−SW (si, t−i)+ IRi(si;ρ i)
]
. (1.9)
3. It is actually dominant strategy incentive compatible.
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And in particular,
Ui(si;si,ρ i) = IRi(si;ρ i). (1.10)
Thus agent i is indifferent between participation and non participation if his type is
equal to the basis si.
Let us define the function
Ki(si,ρ i) = E−iSW (si, t−i)− IRi(si;ρ i). (1.11)
Ki(si,ρ i) represents the difference between the expected social welfare if agent i
participates truthfully to the mechanism and his expected utility if he does not participate
at all, when his type is si and the planner threatens to choose an alternative according to
ρ i. I may rewrite the equilibrium utility as :
Ui(ti;si,ρ i) = E−iSW (t)−Ki(si,ρ i). (1.12)
This expression shows that Ki may be viewed as the disutility of agent i if he parti-
cipates truthfully to a mechanism with basis si and threat ρ i. This disutility is a conse-
quence of the choice of the basis and threat. The planner has a total control on the di-
sutility through si and ρ i. Once an efficient allocation rule has been chosen the planner
chooses s and ρ in order to induce truthful participation of the agents while seeking to
maximize his own expected surplus. The expression (1.12) implies that Ki is also the
expected social welfare, from agent i’s perspective, if he is not considered as part of the
society. This expected social welfare (E−iSW (t)−Ui(ti;si,ρ i)) is therefore independent
of his true type ti.
For i ∈N , I consider the following set :
Si(ρ i)≡ argmin
ti∈Ti
Ki(ti,ρ i). (1.13)
Si(ρ i) is simply the set of minimizers of the function Ki(.,ρ i). I will say that Si(ρ i) is
nonempty to mean that Ki(.,ρ i) has a minimum. Let S(ρ)≡ ×
i∈N
Si(ρ i); I will say that S
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is nonempty valued to mean that Ki(.,ρ i) has a minimum for every agent i and for every
vector of threats ρ .
The following lemma characterizes individual rationality.
Lemma 2. A VCG mechanism (q,s,ρ) is IR if and only if s ∈ S(ρ).
Proof. Using (1.9) and (1.13) one can see that Ui(ti;q,ρ i) ≥ IRi(ti;ρ i) is equivalent to
E−iSW (t)−E−iSW (si, t−i;q)+ IRi(si;ρ i)≥ IRi(ti;ρ i), i.e. to Ki(ti,ρ i)≥ Ki(si,ρ i).
1.3.3 Results
The next theorem shows that an appropriate choice of the basis and threats maxi-
mizes the planner’s surplus among efficient, IC and IR mechanisms, when S is nonempty
valued.
Theorem 1. Assume that for every i ∈N :
(C1) Si is non empty valued,
(C2) s∗i ∈ Si(ρ i∗),
(C3) ρ i∗ ∈ arg max
ρ i∈Mi
inf
si∈Ti
Ki(si,ρ i).
Let ρ∗ = (ρ i∗)i∈N and s∗ = (s∗i )i∈N . Then for any q∗ ∈ E the VCG mechanism
(q∗,s∗,ρ∗) maximizes the expected surplus among efficient, IC and IR mechanisms. The
maximal surplus is equal to :
∑
i∈N
Ki(s∗i ,ρ
i∗)− (n−1)ESW (t).
This shows that it is optimal to choose the basis and threats so that : (C2) the ba-
sis minimizes the disutility from a truthful participation of any agent given the optimal
threats and also, (C3) the minimal disutility of an agent under the optimal threat is at
least equal to the minimal disutility under any other threat. (C2) ensures that the mecha-
nism is IR and (C3) is meant to maximize the surplus of the planner. The planner wants
to maximize the disutility of the agents because it would increases his own surplus ; and
he wants to minimize it in order to give agents incentives to participate.
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Proof. Let (q,µ,ρ) be efficient, IC and IR. Take s ∈ T and let m = m(.;q,ρ|s). By the
revenue equivalence property we have :
E−iµi(ti, t−i)−E−imi(ti, t−i;q,ρ|s) = E−iµi(si, t−i)−E−imi(si, t−i;q,ρ|s)
= E−iui(si, t−i;q,m)−E−iui(si, t−i;q,µ)
= IRi(si;ρ i)−E−iui(si, t−i;q,µ)≤ 0.
Therefore
E ∑
i∈N
mi(t;q,ρ|s)≥ E ∑
i∈N
µi(t).
That is : an efficient, IC and IR mechanism (q,µ,ρ) results in an expected surplus
weakly lower than any VCG mechanism with the same allocation rule.
Finally, for s ∈ S(ρ) we have :
E ∑
i∈N
mi(t;q,ρ|s) = E
{
∑
i∈N
[
SW (si, t−i)− IRi(si;ρ i)
]− (n−1)SW (t)}
= ∑
i∈N
[
E−iSW (si, t−i)− IRi(si;ρ i)
]− (n−1)ESW (t)
= ∑
i∈N
min
s′i∈Ti
[
E−iSW (s′i, t−i)− IRi(s′i;ρ i)
]− (n−1)ESW (t) (s ∈ S(ρ))
≤ ∑
i∈N
min
s′i∈Ti
[
E−iSW (s′i, t−i)− IRi(s′i;ρ i∗)
]− (n−1)ESW (t) (by (C3))
= ∑
i∈N
[
E−iSW (s∗i , t−i)− IRi(s∗i ;ρ i∗)
]− (n−1)ESW (t)
= E ∑
i∈N
mi(t;q∗,ρ∗|s∗).
It is shown in krishna and Perry (2000) that a VCG mechanism maximizes the ex-
pected payment of each agent. Beside the revenue equivalence property, their result also
relies on the fact that efficient allocation rules must be equal almost surely. This last
condition follows from their assumption and is clearly suggested by their argument for
the theorem (see also Krishna 2002, P. 76-77). This result no longer holds in situations
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where there exist efficient allocations rules that are different with positive probabilities.
For instance, this will be the case if type sets are discrete. However the expected surplus
may still be maximized provided the revenue equivalence property holds.
A saddle point of the function Ki is a couple (s¯i, ρ¯ i) such that
Ki(s¯i,ρ i)≤ Ki(s¯i, ρ¯ i)≤ Ki(si, ρ¯ i),∀(si,ρ i) ∈ Ti×Mi (1.14)
or equivalently
inf
si∈Ti
sup
ρ i∈Mi
Ki(si,ρ i) = Ki(s¯i, ρ¯ i) = sup
ρ i∈Mi
inf
si∈Ti
Ki(si,ρ i). (1.15)
As consequence of the theorem, the mechanism design problem may be solved by a
search for saddle points of the functions Ki if they exist.
Proposition 1. Assume that S is non empty valued and Ki possess a saddle point for
every agent i. Then for any q∗ ∈ E the sufficient conditions (C2) and (C3) of the theorem
are satisfied if and only if (s∗i ,ρ i∗) is a saddle point of Ki.
Proof. when Si is nonempty valued we have inf
si∈Ti
Ki(si,ρ i) = min
si∈Ti
Ki(si,ρ i). Since Ki
has at least one saddle point then inf
si∈Ti
sup
ρ i∈Mi
Ki(si,ρ i) = sup
ρ i∈Mi
inf
si∈Ti
Ki(si,ρ i). If (s∗i ,ρ i∗)
satisfies (C2) and (C3) then Ki(s∗i ,ρ i∗) = minsi∈Ti
Ki(si,ρ i∗) ≥ min
si∈Ti
Ki(si,ρ i),∀ρ i. Therefore
Ki(s∗i ,ρ i∗) = max
ρ i∈Mi
min
si∈Ti
Ki(si,ρ i) and (s∗i ,ρ i∗) is a saddle point. Now assume (s¯i, ρ¯ i) is a
saddle point of Ki and Si is nonempty valued. then by definition Ki(s¯i, ρ¯ i) =min
si∈Ti
Ki(si, ρ¯ i)
and Ki(s¯i, ρ¯ i) = sup
ρ i∈Mi
inf
si∈Ti
Ki(si,ρ i), i.e. (C2) and (C3) hold.
Let us consider the following condition :
(C4) for a.e t−i ∈ T−i, if wi(a,s∗i , t−i)> mina′∈A−iwi(a
′,s∗i , t−i) then ρ i∗a (t−i) = 0.
The condition (C4) means that the planner’s threat is to randomly choose an alterna-
tive that would generate the worst non participation utility to agent i if his type was s∗i .
It is important to remember that the planner does not observe private types and if agent
i does not participate it is not revealed. Under (C4) the planner acts as though agent i’s
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type was s∗i . Hence the planner would choose only alternatives that generate the worst
utility to agent i with presumed type s∗i .
Proposition 2. The conditions (C2) and (C4) characterize the saddle points of Ki.
Proof. Assume that (s∗i ,ρ i∗) satisfies (C2) and (C4).
For any (si,ρ i),
Ki(si,ρ i∗) ≥ inf
ti∈Ti
E−i ∑
a∈A−i
[
ρ i∗a (t−i)(SW (t)−wi(a, t))
]
= Ki(s∗i ,ρ
i∗) (by (C2))
≥ E−i ∑
a∈A−i
[
ρ ia(t−i)(SW (s
∗
i , t−i)−wi(a,s∗i , t−i))
]
(by (C4))
= Ki(s∗i ,ρ
i).
Now let (s∗i ,ρ i∗) be a saddle point.
By definition ρ i∗ ∈ arg max
ρ i∈Mi
inf
si∈Ti
Ki(si,ρ i) and Ki(s∗i ,ρ i∗) = infti∈Ti
Ki(ti,ρ i∗) i.e. s∗i ∈
Si(ρ i∗). I need only show that (C4) is satisfied. First note that
∑
a∈A−i
[
ρ i∗a (t−i)(SW (s
∗
i , t−i)−wi(a,s∗i , t−i))
]≤ max
a∈A−i
(SW (s∗i , t−i)−wi(a,s∗i , t−i)) .
(s∗i ,ρ i∗) is a saddle point therefore Ki(s∗i ,ρ i∗) ≥ Ki(s∗i ,ρ i) ∀ρ i. Choosing ρ i such that
∑
a∈A−i
[
ρ ia(t−i)(SW (s
∗
i , t−i)−wi(a,s∗i , t−i))
]
= max
a∈A−i
(SW (s∗i , t−i)−wi(a,s∗i , t−i))∀t−i,
I obtain :
E−i ∑
a∈A−i
[
ρ i∗a (t−i)(SW (s
∗
i , t−i)−wi(a,s∗i , t−i))
]
= E−i maxa∈A−i
(SW (s∗i , t−i)−wi(a,s∗i , t−i))
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and
∑
a∈A−i
[
ρ i∗a (t−i)(SW (s
∗
i , t−i)−wi(a,s∗i , t−i))
]
= max
a∈A−i
(SW (s∗i , t−i)−wi(a,s∗i , t−i)) for a.e t−i.
This implies (C4).
Proposition 2 characterizes the saddle points by the conditions (C2) and (C4). In ge-
neral these two conditions are interdependent and constitute an implicit characterization
of the saddle points. In some cases however the correspondence Si may be independent
of the threat ρ i. For example when the non participation utility of an agent is independent
of his own type, or if outside options are exogenous (i.e. independent of the chosen al-
ternative) or finally, in case of monotonicity, when type sets are ordered and Si(ρ i) is an
extremum of the set Ti. In these situations s∗i is independently determined and the threats
are just irrelevant :s∗i ∈ argmaxti∈Ti Ki(ti). This is the optimal choice of the basis in Krishna
and Perry (2000).
1.4 The case : wi(a, t)≡ v¯i(a, ti)+ vˆi(t)
In this case each agent’s non participation payoffs have an endogenous (own-type de-
pendent) component and an exogenous component that may depend on all agents’ types.
For example the case of purely endogenous outside options (wi(a, t) ≡ vi(a, ti)) corres-
ponds to the situation where the payoffs of an agent who participates to the mechanism
equals his utility if he does not participate.
The expected outside option of agent i is :
IRi(ti;ρ i) = E−i ∑
a∈A−i
ρ ia(t−i)v¯i(a, ti)+E−i vˆi(t)
= ∑
a∈A−i
v¯i(a, ti)E−iρ
i
a(t−i)+E−i vˆi(t)
= ∑
a∈A−i
v¯i(a, ti)ρ¯ ia+E−i vˆi(t),
where E−iρ i = ρ¯ i ∈ ∆(A−i). Therefore IRi(ti;ρ i) depends on ρ i only through its mean
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ρ¯ i ∈ ∆(A−i) : IRi(ti;ρ i) ≡ IRi(ti; ρ¯ i). Hence the optimal threats can be chosen constant
and Mi may be identified with ∆(A−i).
The disutility of agent i for a basis ti and a threat ρ i is :
Ki(ti,ρ i) = E−i [SW (t)− vˆi(t)]− ∑
a∈A−i
v¯i(a, ti)ρ ia. (1.16)
The following result gives some sufficient conditions for the existence of optimal
threats and basis.
Proposition 3. Assume that for every i ∈N :
(C5) Ti is a compact convex metric space,
(C6) ∀a ∈ A−i, ∀t−i ∈ T−i, SW (., t−i)−wi(a, ., t−i) is lower semicontinuous,
(C7) for a.e t−i ∈ T−i SW (., t−i)− max
a∈A−i
wi(a, ., t−i)≥−θi(t−i), where θi is non nega-
tive and integrable.
(C8) ti 7→ E−i [SW (t)− vˆi(t)] is quasiconvex and ∀a ∈ A−i v¯i(a, .) is concave.
Then Ki has a saddle point (s∗i ,ρ i∗) for every i ∈N . Let ρ∗ = (ρ i∗)i∈N and s∗ =
(s∗i )i∈N . Then for any q∗ ∈ E the VCG mechanism (q∗,s∗,ρ∗) maximizes the expected
surplus among efficient, IC and IR mechanisms.
Proof. Ki(si, .) is continuous and linear, and ∆(A−i) is convex and compact in the eu-
clidean topology. (C8) implies that Ki(.,ρ i) is quasiconvex ∀ρ i ∈ ∆(A−i). By Sion’s
minimax theorem I need only show that Ki(.,ρ i) is lower semicontinuous to conclude to
the existence of a saddle point. Consider a sequence tni converging to ti.
(C6) ⇒ ρ ia(t−i)(SW (t)−wi(a, t))≤ liminfρ ia(t−i)(SW (tni , t−i)−wi(a, tni , t−i)),∀a ∈ A−i,∀t−i ∈ T−i
⇒ ∑
a∈A−i
ρ ia(t−i)(SW (t)−wi(a, t))≤ ∑
a∈A−i
liminfρ ia(t−i)(SW (t
n
i , t−i)−wi(a, tni , t−i)),∀t−i ∈ T−i
⇒ ∑
a∈A−i
ρ ia(t−i)(SW (t)−wi(a, t))≤ liminf ∑
a∈A−i
ρ ia(t−i)(SW (t
n
i , t−i)−wi(a, tni , t−i)),∀t−i ∈ T−i
⇒ E−i ∑
a∈A−i
ρ ia(t−i)(SW (t)−wi(a, t))≤ E−i liminf ∑
a∈A−i
ρ ia(t−i)(SW (t
n
i , t−i)−wi(a, tni , t−i))
⇒ E−i ∑
a∈A−i
ρ ia(t−i)(SW (t)−wi(a, t))≤ liminfE−i ∑
a∈A−i
ρ ia(t−i)(SW (t
n
i , t−i)−wi(a, tni , t−i))
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Where the last implication follows from the extended Fatou’s lemma. Therefore Ki(.,ρ i)
is lower semicontinuous. Since Ti is compact I may conclude that Si(ρ i)= argmin
ti∈Ti
Ki(ti,ρ i) 6=
/0. Therefore all the conditions of theorem 1 are satisfied.
SW (t)−wi(a, t) is the difference between social welfare if agent i participates and
his utility if he does not participate and alternative a is chosen. (C7) means that this
difference has a non positive lower bound that is independent on the chosen alternative. It
is satisfied if payoffs and utilities are bounded. Condition (C6) is satisfied if the functions
wi(a, ., t−i) are continuous and the functions vi(a, .) are lower semicontinuous.
As mentioned earlier the conditions (C2) and (C4) may be used to determine the op-
timal threats and basis. This can be done either analytically or numerically. In particular
when Ki is smooth, first and second order conditions for optimization may be used for
condition (C2). Below I propose an algorithm for approximating the threat and the basis.
Algorithm 1. pick ρ i0 ∈ ∆(A−i),
∀l ≥ 0 let sli ∈ argminti∈TiKi(ti,ρ
il),
ρ il+1 ∈ ∆(A−i) : ρ il+1a = 0 if v¯i(a,sli)> mina∈A−iv¯i(a
′,sli).
Proposition 4. Suppose that ∀a ∈ A−i v¯i(a, .) is continuous. Then under the conditions
of proposition 3 the sequence (sli,ρ
il)l≥0 possess at least one cluster point and every
cluster point is a saddle point of Ki.
Proof. Since Ti×∆(A−i) is compact the sequence (sli,ρ il)l≥0 possess a convergent sub-
sequence (slpi ,ρ
ilp)p≥0 with limit (s∗i ,ρ i∗)∈Ti×∆(A−i). Ki(si, .) is continuous and Ki(., .)
is lower semicontinuous. Leininger’s maximum theorem implies that argmin
ti∈Ti
Ki(ti, .) is
upper hemicontinuous and therefore (C2) is satisfied : s∗i ∈ argminti∈TiKi(ti,ρ
i∗). If v¯i(a,s∗i )>
v¯i(a′,s∗i ) then for n≥ n0 we also have v¯i(a,sli)> v¯i(a′,sli) and ρ il+1a = 0. Taking the limit
I obtain ρ i∗a = 0 : (C4) is satisfied. the conclusion follows from proposition 2.
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1.5 Application : multi-unit auctions
1.5.1 The market
I consider a seller of m units of an indivisible good who wants to allocate the units
efficiently but is also interested in maximizing his expected surplus. In this application
the agents are the potential buyers. Buyer i’s type is ti = (pii,δi) where pii = (pi li )l=1,...,m
and δi = (δ ji ) j∈N −{i}. pi
l
i is the marginal valuation of the l
th unit for buyer i and δ ji is the
marginal disutility of buyer i when buyer j possesses some units of the good. I assume
that marginal valuations are decreasing with the number of units possessed by a buyer.
Buyer i’s type set is :
Ti =
{
ti ∈ Rm+n−1+ : pimi ≤ pim−1i ≤ ...≤ pi1i ≤ p¯ii and δ ji ≤ δ¯i ∀ j ∈N −{i}
}
.
An alternative is a vector a = (ai)i∈N where ai represents the number of units sold to
agent i. The set of pure alternatives is A =
{
a ∈ N : ∑
i∈N
ai ≤ m
}
. The payoff functions
are
vi(a, ti) =
ai
∑
l=1
pi li − ∑
j∈N −{i}
δ ji a j. (1.17)
I assume that outside options are purely endogenous so that wi(a, t) = vi(a, ti). The set
of available alternatives when buyer i does not participate is A−i = {a ∈ A : ai = 0}.
Let us denote δ j+ = ∑
i∈N −{ j}
δ ji the marginal disutility buyer j exerts on all the other
buyers when he is allocated the good. I call pi li −δ i+ the relative bid of buyer i for the lth
unit it is the difference between his valuation for the lth unit and the marginal disutility
he exerts on all the other buyers.
The set Ti is convex and the function vi(a, ti) is convex in ti ; the Hypothesis I in
Krishna and Maenner (2001) is satisfied. Therefore the revenue equivalence property is
satisfied.
1.5.2 Surplus maximizing auction
The efficient social welfare is given by SW (t) = max
a∈A ∑i∈N
vi(a, ti).
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∑
i∈N
vi(a, ti)= ∑
i∈N
ai
∑
l=1
pi li − ∑
j∈N
∑
i∈N −{ j}
δ ji a j = ∑
i∈N
ai
∑
l=1
pi li − ∑
i∈N
δ i+ai = ∑
i∈N
ai
∑
l=1
(
pi li −δ i+
)
This last expression shows that an efficient allocation rule is to allocate an object to
the positive relative bids among the m highest.
I shall denote a∗ the efficient allocation rule just described. Formally the following
conditions characterize the allocation rule a∗(t).
(E1) ∀i ∈N ,a∗i > 0⇒ pia
∗
i
i −δ i+ > 0
(E2) ∀i ∈N : a∗i > 0,∀ j ∈N : j 6= i,pia
∗
i
i −δ i+ ≥ pi
a∗j+1
j −δ j+
(E3) ∑
i∈N
a∗i < m⇒∀ j ∈N ,0≥ pi
a∗j+1
j −δ j+
(E1) and (E2) means that units are allocated only to the highest positive relative
bids. (E3) means that it is efficient to allocate additional units as long as relative bids are
positive.
For every i ∈N and a ∈ A, vi(a, .) is continuous bounded and affine. Therefore the
conditions (C5)− (C8) are satisfied. Proposition 3 implies that for every i ∈ N there
exist an optimal couple of basis and threat (s∗i ,ρ i∗).
If he does not participate to the mechanism, buyer i expects a payoff equal to IRi(s∗i ;ρ i∗)=
min
a∈A−i
vi(a,s∗i ) (by condition (C4)).
The payment rule is given by :
mi(t;a∗,ρ∗|s∗) = SW (s∗i , t−i)−SW−i(t;a∗)− mina∈A−ivi(a,s
∗
i ). (1.18)
SW (s∗i , t−i) is the some of the positive relative bids among the m highest if buyer i
had type s∗i . SW−i(t;a∗) is the some of the positive relative bids among the m highest
except those of buyer i when he reveals the type ti.
Hence the efficient mechanism generalizes the Vickrey auction (see Vickrey 1961)
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which corresponds to the case s∗i = 0.
1.5.3 Absolutely continuous prior
In the rest of this section I assume that hyperplanes in the space of (δ j) j 6=i have
measure zero with respect to µ−i for every i ∈N . This is satisfied if the probabilities µi
are absolutely continuous with respect to the lebesgue measure. Given that the functions
vi(a, .) are differentiable, I may conclude that the social welfare SW (t) =max
a∈A ∑i∈N
vi(a, ti)
is differentiable almost surely and E−i [SW (t)] is differentiable.
Fix i ∈N , for j 6= i we have :
∂
∂δ ji
E−i [SW (t)] = E−i
[
∂
∂δ ji
SW (t)
]
= E−i
[
∂
∂δ ji
∑
a∈A
(
∑
k∈N
vk(a, tk)
)
.1(a = a∗(t))
]
= E−i
[
∑
a∈A
(
∂
∂δ ji
∑
k∈N
vk(a, tk)
)
.1(a = a∗(t))
]
= E−i
[
∑(−
a∈A
a j).1(a = a∗(t))
]
,
and finally :
∂
∂δ ji
E−i [SW (t)] =−∑
a∈A
a j.Pr(a = a∗(t)|ti). (1.19)
The expected disutility of agent i if he participates to the mechanism under the basis
ti and threat ρ i is given by :
Ki(ti,ρ i) = E−i [SW (t)]− ∑
a∈A−i
v¯i(a, ti)ρ ia = E−i [SW (t)]+ ∑
a∈A−i
∑
j∈N −{i}
δ ji a jρ
i
a (1.20)
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It is important to keep in mind that this disutility is caused by the choice of the basis
and threat by the planner and is different from the disutility caused by other buyers who
possess the good.
Equations 1.19 and 1.20 imply that the marginal expected disutility of agent i (when
he participates) with respect to δ ji , under the basis ti and threat ρ
i is given by :
∂
∂δ ji
Ki(ti,ρ i) = ∑
a∈A−i
a jρ ia−∑
a∈A
a j.Pr(a = a∗(t)|ti). (1.21)
This is just the difference between the expected number of units agent j receives
when agent i does not participate and when he participates with type ti.
Thus, from the perspective of agent i, if he wants to participate, a slight decrease in
the (marginal) effect of any other agent is desirable as long as agent i currently expects
that agent to obtain more units if agent i decided to not participate.
Note also that the non participation utility of buyer i is vi(a, ti) = − ∑
j∈N −{i}
δ ji a j. It
is minimized if all the units are allocated only to buyers causing the highest marginal
effect to buyer i, and the minimal value is − max
j∈N −{i}
mδ ji . I may write the following
proposition.
Proposition 5. Let ρ i∗ ∈ ∆(A−i), pi∗i = [0, p¯ii] and δ ∗i ∈
[
0, δ¯i
]n−1
. If the prior is abso-
lutely continuous, then ((pi∗i ,δ ∗i ),ρ i∗) is an optimal choice of the basis and threat if and
only if :
(1) pi∗i = 0
(2) ρ i∗a = 0 ∀a ∈ A−i : ∑
j∈N −{i}
δ ∗ ji a j < maxj∈N −{i}
mδ ∗ ji
(3) ∀ j ∈N −{i} ,
∑
a∈A−i
a jρ i∗a = ∑
a∈A
a j.Pr(a = a∗(t)|ti = (0,δ ∗i )) i f δ ∗ ji ∈
(
0, δ¯i
)
∑
a∈A−i
a jρ i∗a ≥ ∑
a∈A
a j.Pr(a = a∗(t)|ti = (0,δ ∗i )) i f δ ∗ ji = 0
∑
a∈A−i
a jρ i∗a ≤ ∑
a∈A
a j.Pr(a = a∗(t)|ti = (0,δ ∗i )) i f δ ∗ ji = δ¯i
Proposition 5 shows how the planner may set the basis and threats. (1) He may
presume that agents who do not participate do not value the good at all. (2) The object
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is allocated only to agents who would affect agent i the most if he does not participate
and his type is correctly presumed by the planner (i.e. is equal to the basis). (3) If the
presumed (marginal) external effect on some agent i is interior then the planner threatens
to ensure that, if agent i does not participate, the expected number of units allocated to
any other agent equals the expected number of units of that agent if agent i participated
and revealed he has no valuation for the units but that the externality of other agents
on him correspond to the presumed external effect. If the presumed (marginal) external
effect on some agent i is 0 (resp. δ¯i) then the planner threatens to ensure that, if agent i
does not participate, the expected number of units allocated to any other agent is weakly
greater (resp. lower) than the expected number of units of that agent if agent i participated
and revealed that he has no valuation for the units but that the externality of other agents
on him correspond to the presumed external effect.
Proof. We know from propositions 2 and 1 that optimality is equivalent to the conditions
(C2) and (C4). (2) is simply an expression of the condition (C4). I need to show that
condition (C2) is satisfied that is :
Ki((0,δ ∗i ),ρ
i∗)≤ Ki((pii,δi),ρ i∗),∀(pii,δi) ∈ Ti.
First observe that
Ki((0,δi),ρ i∗)≤ Ki((pii,δi),ρ i∗),∀(pii,δi) ∈ Ti. (1.22)
Since the objective is a convex function, the solutions of the optimization program
arg min
δi∈[0,δ¯i]n−1
Ki((0,δi),ρ i∗) are characterized by the following condition :
∑
j 6=i
∂
∂δ ji
Ki((0,δi),ρ i).(δ ji −δ ∗ ji )≥ 0,∀δi ∈
[
0, δ¯i
]n−1
. (1.23)
Moreover, using equation (1.21), it is easy to show that the condition (1.23) is equi-
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valent to the conditions (3) in proposition 5. Thus any solution of (3) is optimal :
Ki((0,δ ∗i ),ρ
i∗)≤ Ki((0,δi),ρ i∗) ∀δi ∈
[
0, δ¯i
]n−1
.
Therefore (C2) holds.
Reciprocally, we want to show that if (C2) and (C4) are true then so are (1), (2)
and (3). Since (2) and (C4) are equivalent, we need only show that (1) and (3) are
true. In fact we need only show that (1) is true, since (C2) would then imply that δ ∗i ∈
arg min
δi∈[0,δ¯i]n−1
Ki((0,δi),ρ i∗), which has already been said to be equivalent to (3). The
inequality (1.22) together with
(C2) : Ki((pi∗i ,δ
∗
i ),ρ
i∗)≤ Ki((pii,δi),ρ i∗),∀(pii,δi) ∈ Ti
imply that Ki((pi∗i ,δ ∗i ),ρ i∗) = Ki((0,δ ∗i ),ρ i∗). This in turn implies that,
for almost every t−i ∈ T−i,
SW ((pi∗i ,δ
∗
i ), t−i) = SW ((0,δ
∗
i ), t−i). (1.24)
Assume that pi∗i 6= 0 i.e. pi∗1i > 0. SW ((pii,δi), t−i) is the sum of the m highest positive
relative bids (the top list of relative bids) ; thus SW ((pi∗i ,δ ∗i ), t−i) = SW ((0,δ ∗i ), t−i) if
and only if the highest relative bid of agent i (when (pii,δi) = (pi∗i ,δ ∗i )) is not positive
or is lower than the mth highest relative bid. Indeed when the type of agent i changes
from (0,δ ∗i ) to (pi∗i ,δ ∗i ) the relative bids of all other agents remain unchanged ; with
probability 1 the relative bids of agent i are initially negative and thus absent from the
top list. The top list of relative bids won’t change unless the relative bids of agent i enters
the top list. Now consider the set of type vectors
H =
{
t−i ∈ T−i : ∀ j : j 6= i,pi∗1i −δ i+ > pi1j −δ j+,pi∗1i −δ i+ > 0
}
;
H represents the set of types for which agent i has the highest positive relative bid.
31
It is the non empty interior of a polyhedron with positive lebesgue measure. Elements
of H do not satisfy SW ((pi∗i ,δ ∗i ), t−i) = SW ((0,δ ∗i ), t−i) and yet the probability of H is
positive. This is in contradiction with 1.24 and therefore pi∗i = 0.
Proposition 5 shows that the planner will always presume that an agent who does
not participate does not value the good. However he may presume that there are negative
external effects on that agent (δ ∗i 6= 0). When is it optimal to choose δ ∗i = 0 ? In order
to answer the question observe that if δ ∗i = 0 then the condition (2) of proposition 5 is
trivially satisfied and all the conditions in proposition 5 reduce to pi∗i = 0 and to
∑
a∈A−i
a jρ i∗a ≥ ∑
a∈A
a j.Pr(a = a∗(0, t−i)),∀ j ∈N −{i} . (1.25)
Therefore the following corollary characterizes the situations under which it is opti-
mal to choose the basis δ ∗i = 0.
Corollary 1. It is optimal to choose t∗i = 0 if and only if the system of inequalities (1.25)
has a solution ρ i∗ ∈ ∆(A−i), which is then the corresponding optimal threat to agent i.
In other words, it is optimal to presume that an agent i who does not participate
has no valuation for the units and suffers no externality if and only if the planner may
threaten to ensure that, if agent i does not participate, each participant will expect at
least as much units as he would if agent i revealed he has no valuation for the units and
suffers no externality.
In that case the optimal expected surplus is :
∑
i∈N
E−iSW (0, t−i)− (n−1)ESW (t).
Buyer i pays
SW (0, t−i)−SW−i(t),
i.e. buyer i pays the difference between the positive presumed relative bids among
the m highest and the positive relative bids among the m highest that are not his own. If
there are no externalities, relative bids are simply bids and the previous difference is just
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the ai highest rejected bids that are not buyer i’s if he wins ai units. This is the payment
rule of the Vickrey auction.
I close this section with two examples of situations in which it is optimal to set as a
basis t∗i = 0.
Example 1. A single unit for sale (m = 1)
I denote [i] the alternative in which the good goes to agent i and [0] the alternative
in which the seller keeps the good. If an agent does not participate he cannot be given
the object. The two terms of the inequality (1.25) are respectively ∑
j′ 6=i
a jρ i∗[ j′] = ρ
i∗
[ j] and
∑
j′
a j.Pr([ j′] = a∗(0, t−i)) = Pr([ j] = a∗(0, t−i)). Therefore the planner may set the basis
t∗i = 0, and sets the threats such that the probability to give the good to an agent if agent
i does not participate is at least equal to the probability that the same agent obtains
the good when agent i participates even though he does not value the good and is not
affected by its possession by others : ρ i∗[ j] ≥ Pr([ j] = a∗(0, t−i)),∀ j 6= i,0.
Example 2. Duopsony (n = 2)
The set of alternatives is A =
{
(a1,a2) ∈ N2 : a1+a2 ≤ m
}
. Without loss I shall
fix i = 1. If agent 1 does not participate then the available alternatives consist of a
choice of the number of units to be sold to agent 2 : A−1 = {0,1, ...,m} . The expected
number of units received by agent 2 if agent 1 does not participate is ∑
a2=0,...,m
a2ρ i∗a2 .
I can also write ∑
a∈A
a2.Pr(a = a∗(0, t2)) = ∑
a2=0,...,m
∑
a1=0,...,a2−m
a2.Pr(a = a∗(0, t2)) =
∑
a2=0,...,m
a2
(
∑
a1=0,...,a2−m
Pr(a = a∗(0, t2))
)
. Therefore the inequalities (1.25) are satis-
fied if ρ i∗a2 =
(
∑
a1=0,...,a2−m
Pr(a = a∗(0, t2))
)
. i.e. the probability that agent 2 receives
a given number of units if agent 1 does not participate is equal to the probability that
he obtains the same number of units if both agents participate though agent 1 does not
value the good and is not affected by its possession by agent 2.
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the problem of choosing an efficient alternative for a group
of privately informed agents with diverse interests. A second objective of the designer
was to maximize the surplus collected from the agents among mechanisms that induce
truthful participation of all agents. In this environment, agents who do not participate
to the decision process might still be affected by the decision. In addition to an alloca-
tion rule and a payment rule, the designer must choose appropriate threats in order to
give agents the incentive to participate and maximize his own expected surplus. Since
an agent who does not participate does not reveal his private information, the planner
decides on his own what he considers as that private information (his presumed type)
and threatens to choose an alternative that would give the worst utility to this agent. A
maxmin choice of the presumed type and the threat is shown to maximize the expected
surplus among efficient mechanisms inducing truthful participation of all the agents.
I also provided an existence result for outside utility that may be decomposed into
two additive components : an exogenous component and an endogenous component. I
then applied the results to design an efficient multiunit auction for environments where
a buyer in possession of the good causes negative externalities on other buyers. I sho-
wed that a generalization of the Vickrey auction maximizes the surplus among efficient
mechanisms inducing truthful participation. Other possible applications include the pro-
blem of siting noxious facilities, elections, the siting of sport events, the sale of nuclear
weapons etc.
In some situations the planner would seek to implement a mechanism so that there is
no additional fund from the planner or any surplus. Such mechanisms are called budget
balanced. Formally a mechanism (q,µ,ρ) is budget balanced if : ∑
i∈N
µi(t) = 0 for every
type vector t. As pointed out in Krishna and Perry (2000) the existence of such mecha-
nisms is determined by the sign of the maximal surplus. Though different assumptions
are used in this paper, this result remains valid and the constructive proof (which relies
mostly on the revenue equivalence) is similar. In fact using the same techniques one may
show that it is sufficient that any efficient mechanism inducing truthful participation of
34
all agents results in a positive surplus. This may be useful in applications where a closed
form for the surplus maximizing mechanism cannot be found. In such applications it
is sufficient to have an approximation of the surplus maximizing mechanism that itself
results in a positive surplus and construct from it a budget balanced mechanism.
Finally it would be interesting in further research to relax the assumption that the
types of agents are independent and to allow agents to act in a concerted way.
CHAPITRE 2
IS THE FAIR RETURN RULE MORE EXPENSIVE THAN FREE
COMPETITION ?
Abstract
We consider the fair return rule used by the European Space Agency (ESA). This
rule ensures each member state of ESA a return proportional to its contribution, in the
form of contracts awarded to firms coming from that state. The fair return rule is in
conflict with the principle of free competition since contracts are not necessarily awar-
ded to firms with the lowest bids. This has raised debates on the use of this rule : it is
well accepted by small states, but larger states with strong national space programs, see
its strict use as an obstacle to competitiveness and cost effectiveness. It is easy to be-
lieve that this rule is more costly to the agency than traditional auctions. We show on the
contrary that an adequate implementation of the fair return rule may cause it to be less
expensive to the agency than the traditional auctions observing free competition (first
price and second price auctions). We consider the case of complete information where
firms’ technology levels are common knowledge, and the case of incomplete informa-
tion where firms observe privately their production costs. In both cases we show that
by adequately implementing the fair return rule, the agency may even take advantage
of asymmetries between countries in order to expect a lower cost than with traditional
auctions.
2.1 Introduction
The European space agency (ESA) is an independent organization whose role is to
develop space industry in Europe. It is funded by 17 member states and is involved
in many activities related to space exploration and technology. Even though many of
these member states have developed national space programs, ESA achieves far beyond
what is possible within any of these national programs (see Albone et al 2002). ESA’s
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activities are separated into mandatory and optional. Mandatory activities are funded
by all member states, each according to its gross national product, and states contribute
freely to optional activities. According to ESA’s convention (ESA 2003), one objective
of the industrial policy is to :
ensure that all member states participate in an equitable manner, having re-
gard to their financial contribution, in implementing the European space pro-
gram and in the associated development of space technology ; in particular
the agency shall for the execution of the program grant to the fullest extend
possible to industry in all member states which shall be given the maximum
opportunity to participate in the work of technological interest undertaken
for the agency ;
Thus procurements at ESA are globally submitted to the so called fair return rule
which ensures each member state a return in the form of contracts (awarded to firms or
agents coming from that state) proportional to its contribution. Simply ESA’s projects
are divided into smaller projects so that firms of different size and from different states
may participate. One advantage of this rule is that firms have the opportunity to share
experience, scientific knowledge and technology. Another advantage is clearly to give
states incentives to contribute to activities. In practice the fair return rule is implemented
so that the ratio between the share of a state in the values of contracts and its share
in the contribution to the agency’s activities (that is the return rate) must not be lower
than a given threshold. In the beginning of ESA the threshold was set to 0.8, but it has
recently reached 0.98 (ESA 2000). In other words, a contribution of 1 euro from a state
guarantees at least 0.98 euro in the form of contracts awarded to firms from the same
state. Ideally the return rate should be equal to 1. Note that beside the fair return rule,
ESA also seeks to promote free competition whenever the two are not in contradiction.
The traditional understanding of free competition is to allocate contracts to firms who
place the lowest bids regardless of their origins. The implementation of the fair return
rule requires a relatively large period (5 years) at the end of which every member state
should have an appropriate return rate (ESA 2003) ; for it is practically impossible to
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ensure each member state a return equal to its contribution at every moment or at the
end of every auction. In short, ESA applies free competition whenever possible and a
review is constantly made in order to adjust states’ returns when needed. It is done by
applying some particular allocation rules in the remaining auctions depending on the
current return rates. There have been debates on the use of the fair return rule. It still is
well accepted by the small states but larger states, with strong national space programs,
see its strict use as an obstacle to competitiveness and cost effectiveness (ESA 2000).
In addition, ESA and the European Community have recently been working together in
order to write a European space policy. Within this new relationship, the issue of the fair
return rule is also discussed since The European Community uses a different industrial
policy (EC 2002). In this context a formal analysis of the fair return rule is particularly
relevant.
The use of the fair return may generate many questions ; the aim of this paper is to
bring a contribution to the following one : are traditional auctions less expensive to ESA
than the fair return rule ? This question arises from the fact that the fair return rule is
(socially) inefficient, in the sense that a firm with the lowest bid do not necessarily win.
To the best of our knowledge, no formal study has been made to address this issue. We
make a first step in the analysis of the question using a simple model where a buyer
(ESA) is seeking to purchase many items from potential suppliers (firms) of different
origins (member state of ESA). The agency may implement the fair return rule or free
competition. Under free competition contracts for the provision of each item are awarded
independently and the winners are the best bidders (those with lowest bids). Though the
fair return rule is a dynamic mechanism, in this paper however, we adopt a static version
of it in order to keep things simple : under the fair return rule the contracts are awarded
so that all member states are represented by the actual suppliers. It is important to note
that a dynamic version of the fair return rule is actually made of a sequence of static
auctions similar to the one we adopt here but differing one from another by the number
of states involved in each auction. 1 To make things more simple we assume the agency is
1. In practice priority is given to some member states of ESA depending on current return rates. As
return rates vary the priority changes.
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facing a few states and firms ; the agency is willing to purchase two items (a unit of each)
from 4 potential suppliers 1,2,3 and 4. Where suppliers 1 and 2 come from state l and
suppliers 3 and 4 come from state h. We also assume that suppliers 1 and 3 may supply
the first item while suppliers 2 and 4 may supply the second item. Let bi denote supplier
i’s bid. Under free competition the lowest bidder between supplier 1 and 3 (resp. 2 and
4) wins the contract for the first (resp. second) item. Examples include the traditional
first price auction and second price auction. These auctions differ only by their payment
rules. Under the first price auction the winner is paid an amount equal to his bid, while
under the second price auction the winner is paid an amount equal to the second lowest
bid. But the other players receive no payment. Under the fair return rule contracts are
awarded to only one of the pairs {1,4} and {2,3}. If we call aggregate bid of a pair of
suppliers the sum of their bids, then contracts are awarded to the pair with the lowest
aggregate bid. There are many different ways of implementing the static version of the
fair return rule. They simply differ by the payment rules. A natural way is to pay the
winners an amount equal to their bids and pay nothing to the other suppliers. We shall
refer to this auction as the fair return auction (FR). Another way would be to pay each
winner his conjugate bid 2 and nothing to the other suppliers ; we call this the second fair
return auction (SFR).
In presence of asymmetry the conflict between small and large states may be illus-
trated as follows : Imagine a situation where suppliers from state l have lower costs for
the production of the items than their opponents from state h ; under first price auctions
the items are purchased only from suppliers from l since they have more latitude to
make lower bids. Therefore suppliers from h will prefer FR auction to first price auc-
tions contrary to suppliers from l. Moreover in such a setting it is clear that, if suppliers
make the same bids regardless of the industrial policy used, the agency would pay a hi-
gher price under the FR auction than under first price auctions. More generally, without
the assumption of asymmetry, we may reach to the same conclusion. Indeed, under first
price auctions contracts are awarded to lowest bidders at a price equal to these bids ;
but under the FR auction, contracts are awarded to a set of suppliers with the lowest
2. We define this in the next section.
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aggregate bid ; Since some suppliers in this winning set may not have the lowest bid of
their category, the price paid by the agency under the FR auction is higher. Given this, an
affirmative answer to the previous question may seem obvious. But while the previous
argument is true, it rests on the assumption that suppliers’ bids would be the same under
both auctions, and this need not be the case. In fact suppliers’ bids are outcomes of their
individual strategies and, these strategies may change as the rules of the auction change.
We find that free competition may sometimes be more expensive than fair return rule.
In particular, and contrary to the previous argument and first intuition, we show that this
often happens when suppliers from a given state are more competitive than their direct
opponent from the other state. In such conditions one state has a technologic advantage
over the other in the production of all the items. The intuition is this : under the fair
return rule, since suppliers of the same state cannot win simultaneously, a competitive
supplier is in competition not only with the supplier of the same item but also with the
supplier from the same state. A situation that forces competitive suppliers to bid more
aggressively under the fair return rule than under free competition, and results in a lower
cost for the agency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model
and give the basic definitions. In section 3 we consider the case where suppliers have
complete information about the supply costs and find conditions under which the FR
auction is less expensive than first price auctions. Then, in section 4, we consider the
case of incomplete information where each supplier observes privately his own cost.
Due to analytical intractability we do not consider the FR auction, but the SFR auction.
We show that this auction induces a lower social cost than the FR auction. We find
conditions under which these auctions lead to a lower expected price than second price
auctions. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2.2 Preliminaries
An agency is willing to purchase two items from 4 potential suppliers 1,2,3 and 4.
Suppliers 1 and 2 originate from state l and suppliers 3 and 4 from state h. Suppliers 1
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and 3 may supply the first item while suppliers 2 and 4 may supply the second item.
The agency may run the following two policies : free competition and the fair re-
turn rule. With free competition contracts for the provision of each item are awarded
independently and the winners are the best bidders (those with lowest bids). With the
fair return rule contracts are awarded such that all the two states are represented by the
actual suppliers.
We use the letter i for an arbitrary supplier inN = {1,2,3,4}. Given a supplier i the
other suppliers (denoted j, i∗ and j∗) can be identified by their relationship with i : i and
j are supplying the same item while i and i∗ are from the same state. As a consequence
i and j∗ (resp. j and i∗) are from different states and supply different items. Thus under
free competition supplier i faces supplier j and supplier i∗ faces supplier j∗, while pair
{i, j∗} faces pair { j, i∗} under the fair return rule. In the later case suppliers i and j∗
(resp. j and i∗) may be viewed as "partners" since they win or loose the auction together.
We assume however that there is no cooperation between suppliers.
If we denote bi supplier i’s bid for all i inN , then we may define supplier i’s conju-
gate bid as b¯i = b j +bi∗−b j∗. This is the algebraic sum of all the other suppliers’ bids
where his partner bid is counted negatively. Under free competition i wins a contract if
bi ≤ b j, and under the fair return rule he wins if bi+b j∗ ≤ b j +bi∗ (i.e. if bi ≤ b¯i). Sup-
plier i’s conjugate bid somehow summarizes competition under the fair return principle.
Under the two policies nothing is paid to suppliers who do not win contracts and ties are
solved equiprobably.
Examples of auctions with free competition include the traditional first and second
price auctions (they differ only by their payment rules) :
– Under the second price auction (SP) the agency compares the bids of suppliers 1
and 3 and buys the first item from the supplier with the lowest bid at a price equal
to the second lowest bid (in this case the highest bid). Then it compares the bids of
suppliers 2 and 4 and buys the second item from the supplier with the lowest bid
at a price equal to the second lowest bid.
– Under the first price auction (FP) the agency compares the bids of suppliers 1 and
3 and buys the first item from the supplier with the lowest bid at a price equal to
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his bid. Then it compares the bids of suppliers 2 and 4 and buys the second item
from the supplier with the lowest bid at a price equal to his bid.
Examples of auctions with the fair return rule include the fair return auction and the
second fair return auction. They also differ by their payment rule :
– Under the fair return auction (FR) suppliers submit their bids simultaneously and
the items are bought from the pair with the smallest aggregate bid between {1, 4}
and {2, 3}, 3 and each winner is paid his bid.
– Under the second fair return auction (SFR) suppliers submit their bids simulta-
neously and the items are bought from the pair with the smallest aggregate bid
between {1, 4} and {2, 3}, and each winner is paid his conjugate bid.
The information held by the suppliers concerns their costs for supplying the items. If
supplier i wins it will cost him ci to provide the item. Otherwise, it will cost him nothing.
Denote c the costs vector (ci)i∈N . We consider both the cases of complete information
(in section 3) and incomplete information (in section 4). Under complete information
suppliers know each other cost, and under incomplete information each supplier observes
privately his own cost. We will compare the two fair return auctions to the two traditional
auctions. Particularly in the next section we compare the FR auction to the FP auction
on the basis of the total price of the items.
2.3 Complete information : FR vs FP
We suppose that bids and costs are positive multiples of a given constant ε > 0. 4 We
denote f r the total price of the two items under the FR auction. Let f p j be the price of
item j ∈ {1, 2} under the FP auction and let f p= f p1+ f p2. f p j is also the winning bid
for item j. The two auctions induce games of complete information between suppliers.
Their strategies are there bids. We suppose that the possible outcomes of these games
are Nash equilibria. The sum of the winning bids represents the total price paid by the
3. If seller i ∈N submits a bid bi then the aggregate bids of pairs {1, 4} and {2, 3} are respectively
b1+b4 and b2+b3.
4. ε may be understood as the minimum admissible bid. The main result in this section does not change
if bids are positive multiples of a constant and costs are arbitrary positive real numbers.
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agency. In all this section the costs vector c = (ci)i∈N is fixed.
Proposition 6. There exists a Nash equilibrium for the FP and FR auctions.
Actually there may exist multiple Nash equilibria for these two auctions. So we may
not always predict the prices of the items, but we may provide bounds for these prices. In
the main result of this section (proposition 7) we give an upper bound for the difference
between the price under FR and FP auctions ( f r− f p) as well as sufficient conditions
for f r− f p < 0.
Lemma 3. the following assertions are true :
(i) f p1 ≥max(c1,c3)− ε and f p2 ≥max(c2,c4)− ε,
(ii) f r ≤max(c1+ c4,c3+ c2)+4ε.
Under the FP auction f p j is the winning bid for item j and the winner is the supplier
with the smallest cost. Indeed he has more latitude to place a lower bid than his opponent
who cannot bid under his cost. Assertion (i) means that the winning bid for item j is at
least just below the greatest cost of the potential suppliers of that item.
Under the FR auction the winning pair is the pair with the smallest aggregate cost
and f r is the aggregate bid of the winning pair. The winning pair’s aggregate bid is close
to the greatest aggregate cost but, according to assertion (ii), does not exceed it of more
than 4ε .
As a consequence of the lemma, we have an upper bound for f r− f p :
f r− f p≤ 6ε+∆(c) (2.1)
with
∆(c) = max(c1+ c4,c3+ c2)−max(c1,c3)−max(c2,c4). (2.2)
We are now able to state the main result of this section.
Proposition 7. the following assertions are true :
(i) f r− f p≤ 6ε.
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(ii) if c1− c3 and c2− c4 have the same sign and
min(|c1− c3|, |c2− c4|)> 6ε then f r− f p < 0.
Assertion (i) means that even when the FR auction is more expensive than the FP
auction, the difference cannot exceed 6ε . In practice the minimum bid is not greater than
the smallest monetary unit (a cent for example). Thus in terms of the price of the items
the FP auction cannot dominate the FR auction of more than six units.
To understand assertion (ii) recall that suppliers 1 and 3 (resp. 2 and 4) are selling
the same item and thus, are in direct competition with one another. Recall also that
suppliers 1 and 2 (resp. 3 and 4) are from the same state. If we see suppliers’ costs as
an index of their technology levels then, c1−c3 (resp. c2−c4) represents the technology
difference between suppliers 1 and 3 (resp. 2 and 4). The fact that c1− c3 and c2− c4
have the same sign means that suppliers of one state dominate the others with respect to
the technology levels. For example if c1−c3 and c2−c4 are both positive then supplier 3
dominates supplier 1 (his direct opponent) and supplier 4 dominates supplier 2. So state
h dominates state l. Now min(|c1− c3|, |c2− c4|) represents the minimum technology
difference between the states. It is therefore an index of the technology gap between the
states. Assertion (ii) means that if a state dominates the other and if the technology gap is
sufficiently high (greater than 6ε) then the FR auction leads to a lower price than the FP
auction. The intuition is this : if suppliers of a state dominate their direct opponents, they
have no interest in making aggressive bids under the FP auction. On the contrary under
the FR auction they are in direct competition with their fellow state supplier who has a
competitive technology (even though he sells another item) and are virtually associated
with a less competitive supplier. The suppliers need to be more aggressive in order to
win against their fellow state supplier and compensate the weakness of their "virtual
partner". This results in a lower price under the FR auction. Note also that the minimum
gap required in assertion (ii) (6ε) is small.
Proof of proposition 7. (i) This follows from inequality (2.1) and the fact that ∆(c)≤ 0.
Indeed c1+ c4 ≤max(c1,c3)+max(c2,c4) and c3+ c2 ≤max(c1,c3)+max(c2,c4).
Now if c1− c3 and c2− c4 have the same sign then ∆(c) = −min(|c1− c3|, |c2−
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c4|). 5 By inequality (2.1) a sufficient condition for f r− f p < 0 is 6ε +∆(c) < 0, i.e.
min(|c1− c3|, |c2− c4|)> 6ε . Hence (ii).
Note that through the lines of this proof we read the following result :
if c1−c3 and c2−c4 have the same sign then 6ε+min(|c1−c3|, |c2−c4|) is a lower
bound for the price difference | f p− f r|. This lower bound increases as the technology
gap min(|c1− c3|, |c2− c4|) increases. In other words, if a state dominates the other the
price difference under the two auctions tends to increase as the technology gap between
states increases.
In the next section we consider the case where suppliers have private information
about their costs. We do not consider the FR auction but the SFR auction which appears
to be analytically easier to deal with.
2.4 Incomplete information : SFR vs SP
In this section every supplier observes privately his own cost but not the other sup-
pliers’ costs. The common prior for the costs is given by the probability measure µ with
support T = ×
i∈N
Ti, where Ti = [c¯i
, c¯i] for all i ∈ N . We assume that µ is absolutely
continuous with respect to the lebesgue measure, and we denote f its probability density
function. There is no cooperation between the suppliers.
A strategy for supplier i is a function βi : Ti→R+. Under this strategy the value βi(ci)
is supplier i’s bid when he observes a private cost ci. A bid can be any non negative real
number.
2.4.1 Nash equilibria
We determine Nash equilibria under the different auctions. It is well known that under
the SP auction it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid his cost (see Krishna 2000). We
show that this remains true under the SFR auction.
5. A proof of this is given in proposition 16, see appendix.
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Proposition 8. It is a weakly dominant strategy for every supplier to bid his cost under
the SFR auction.
Proof. Denote Ui(ci,bi,b−i) the payoff of supplier i when he bids bi rather than his true
cost ci and the other suppliers bid b−i. We will show that Ui(ci,ci,b−i)≥Ui(ci,bi,b−i).
Recall that
Ui(ci,bi,b−i) =

b¯i− ci if bi < b¯i
1
2(b¯i− ci) if bi = b¯i
0 if bi > b¯i.
Assume bi < ci. If b¯i ≤ bi < ci then Ui(ci,ci,b−i) = 0 and either Ui(ci,bi,b−i) = 0
(when b¯i < bi) or Ui(ci,bi,b−i) = 12(bi− ci)< 0 (when b¯i = bi).
If bi < ci < b¯i then Ui(ci,ci,b−i) = b¯i − ci = Ui(ci,bi,b−i). If bi < b¯i ≤ ci then
Ui(ci,ci,b−i) = 0≥ b¯i− ci =Ui(ci,bi,b−i).
Assume bi > ci. If bi > ci ≥ b¯i then Ui(ci,ci,b−i) = 0 =Ui(ci,bi,b−i). If b¯i > bi > ci
then Ui(ci,ci,b−i) = b¯i−ci =Ui(ci,bi,b−i). If b¯i = bi > ci then Ui(ci,ci,b−i) = b¯i−ci ≥
1
2(b¯i− ci) =Ui(ci,bi,b−i). And finally if bi > b¯i ≥ ci then Ui(ci,ci,b−i) = b¯i− ci ≥ 0 =
Ui(ci,bi,b−i).
Thus the two auctions have at least one equilibrium. We now compare the price of
the two units assuming that suppliers bid their costs. We first compare the prices of the
items expost, i.e. given the actual (though privately observed) costs. Then we compare
the expected prices paid by the agency under the two auctions.
2.4.2 Expost Comparison of the prices
Since suppliers bid their costs at equilibriums, the agency pays the greatest cost under
the SP auction that is (assuming suppliers costs vector is c) :
sp(c) = max(c1,c3)+max(c2,c4) (2.3)
In order to determine the price under the SFR auction, note that if {1,4} is the win-
ning pair then because suppliers bid their costs c1 + c4 ≤ c2 + c3 ; and the agency pays
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the following total amount
c¯1+ c¯4 = (c2+ c3− c1)+(c2+ c3− c4) = 2(c2+ c3)− (c1+ c4). (2.4)
Similarly if {2,3} is the winning pair then c1 + c4 ≥ c2 + c3 and the total price of the
two units is
c¯2+ c¯3 = 2(c1+ c4)− (c2+ c3). (2.5)
Observing that (c¯2 + c¯3)− (c¯1 + c¯4) and (c2 + c3)− (c1 + c4) have opposite signs we
conclude that the price under SFR auction is (assuming suppliers costs vector is c) :
s f r(c) = max(c¯2+ c¯3, c¯1+ c¯4). (2.6)
Given a costs vector c = (c1,c2,c3,c4) ∈ T, The price difference between the two
auctions is :
δ (c) = s f r(c)− sp(c) = max(c¯2+ c¯3, c¯1+ c¯4)−max(c1,c3)−max(c2,c4). (2.7)
Using the equality max(a,b) = a+b+|a−b|2 , we obtain :
2δ (c)= c¯2+ c¯3+ c¯1+ c¯4+ |c¯2+ c¯3− c¯1− c¯4|−(c1+c3)−|c1−c3|−(c2+c4)−|c2−c4|.
Using (2.4), (2.5) and rearranging :
2δ (c) = 3|(c1− c3)− (c2− c4)|− |c1− c3|− |c2− c4|. (2.8)
It appears that δ (c) depends solely on the two differences c1−c3 and c2−c4 which,
again, can be understood respectively as the technology gaps between suppliers 1 and 3
and between suppliers 2 and 4. 6 We define the relative technologic gap across the items
6. Remember that suppliers 1 and 3 produce the same good as suppliers 2 and 4 do.
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as c1−c3c2−c4 ; the sign of this ratio tells us if a state dominates for all items or for only one
item ; if it is positive then suppliers of one state have a better technology than their direct
opponent for all items ; if it is negative then each state has the advantage for only one
item. However the ratio c1−c3c2−c4 does not give information about which state dominates
and for which specific item. Moreover the absolute value of c1−c3c2−c4 says how great is the
advantage on item 1 compared to the advantage on item 2. The advantage on item 1 is
greater if |c1−c3c2−c4 | is greater than 1.
We have the following result :
Proposition 9. given a realization c ∈ T of the suppliers’ costs vector we have :
s f r(c)− sp(c)< 0 if and only if 12 < c1−c3c2−c4 < 2.
This proposition gives a necessary and sufficient condition so that, given a realization
of the suppliers’ costs, the price of the items under the SFR auction is lower than the price
under the SP auction. The condition 12 <
c1−c3
c2−c4 < 2 implies that the relative technologic
gap across the items is positive ; thus there is a state with a higher technology for all
items. This condition also means that the advantages of the suppliers of the strong state
are close enough : the advantage on item 1 (i.e. |c1− c3|) is greater than half of the
advantage on item 2 (i.e. |c2− c4|) but less than twice this advantage.
2.4.3 Comparing the expected prices
In our model the agency does not know the costs of suppliers and therefore cannot
predict exactly what would be the price of the items. Instead it formulates beliefs about
what these costs could be. We model its beliefs by a probability distribution µ for the
costs. We also make the assumption of common beliefs, that is, all the agents (agency
and suppliers) have the same beliefs about the costs. To their eyes costs are random
variables with probability density function f with support T as mentioned earlier in this
section. To compare the two auctions a risk neutral agency would compare the expected
If the costs are such that c1− c3 < 0 and c2− c4 < 0 then the country l has a higher technology than
country h for the production of the two goods.
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prices resulting from these auctions. We denote s f r (resp. sp) the expected price of the
items under the SFR (resp. SP) auction :
sp = E{max(c1,c3)+max(c2,c4)}. (2.9)
s f r = E{max(c¯2+ c¯3, c¯1+ c¯4)}. (2.10)
The difference between the two expected price is :
s f r− sp = E(δ (c)) =
∫
T
δdµ=
∫
T
δ (c) f (c)dc. (2.11)
Let
N = {c ∈ T : δ (c)< 0} (2.12)
and
P = T −N = {c ∈ T : δ (c)≥ 0} . (2.13)
We may write the difference between the two expected prices as :
s f r− sp =
∫
T
δdµ =
∫
P
|δ |dµ−
∫
N
|δ |dµ. (2.14)
This difference depends on the costs’ common prior µ . Hence the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 10. s f r− sp < 0 if and only if µ is such that ∫P |δ |dµ < ∫N |δ |dµ.
Recall that N =
{
c ∈ T : 12 < c1−c3c2−c4 < 2
}
(proposition 9). Thus, the expected price
of the items under the SFR auction is lower than the expected price of the items under
the SP auction if the prior gives "more weight" to the negative side of δ , that is, to
situations where it is believed there is a state with a higher technology for all items, and
the advantages of suppliers from the strong state are close enough.
We next give a condition on the support T for the existence of such a prior.
Proposition 11. The following assertions are equivalent :
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(i) There exists a common prior such that s f r− sp < 0
(ii) the lebesgue measure of the set N =
{
c ∈ T : 12 < c1−c3c2−c4 < 2
}
is positive
(iii)
 c¯1 ≥ c¯ 3c¯4 ≥ c¯ 2 or
 c¯3 ≥ c¯ 1c¯2 ≥ c¯ 4
Assertion (iii) is satisfied for example when {c¯i,c¯i} is the same for all suppliers. So
there exists a belief system (not necessarily symmetric) where suppliers’ costs have the
same support, and for which the expected price under the SFR auction is lower than the
expected price under the SP auction. Actually there exist many such belief systems as one
reads from the proof of the previous proposition. Such beliefs simply give more weight
to situations where there is a state with a higher technology for all items, and where the
advantages of suppliers from the strong state are close enough (12 <
c1−c3
c2−c4 < 2).
Observe that the negation of (iii) can be written as c¯1 < c¯3c¯2 < c¯4 or
 c¯3 < c¯1c¯4 < c¯2 ;
So when it is believed that one state strictly dominates the other, to the point that the
worst costs of each supplier from the dominant state is lower than the lowest costs of its
direct opponent, then the expected price under the SFR auction is never lower than the
expected price under the SP auction. The agency may expect lower costs under the SFR
auction only when this type of dominance is not observed.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper we’ve considered the fair return rule : a rule used by the European Space
Agency which ensures each member state a return in the form of contracts, awarded to
firms coming from that state, globally proportional to its contribution. This rule is some-
how in conflict with the principle of free competition since contracts are not necessarily
awarded to a firm with the lowest bid.
We showed that an adequate implementation of the fair return rule may cause it
to be less expensive than the traditional auctions of free competition (first price and
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second price auctions). We considered the case of complete information (for the first
price auction) where firms’ technology levels are common knowledge, and the case of
incomplete information (for the second price auction) where firms observe privately their
production costs. In both cases we identified an auction under the fair return principle
that takes advantage of asymmetries between countries and yields a lower cost than with
traditional auctions. The price (resp. expected price) of the items under the fair return
rule is lower under the fair return rule in situations where (resp. the agency believes
that) : one state has higher technology level for the production of the items than the
other, and the advantage of suppliers from the high technology state (over their direct
opponents) are close enough.
We have also assumed that the agency does not impose reserve prices. This assump-
tion may be justified by the fact that the buyer’s valuation is known to be too high com-
pared to the suppliers’ costs. So that the buyer cannot reliably commit to not purchase
the items at all. However it would be interesting to compare the two principles in a model
that allows for reservation prices.
CHAPITRE 3
OPTIMAL PROCUREMENT WHEN SUPPLIERS’ ORIGINS MATTER
Abstract
We derive an optimal procurement mechanism in an environment where a buyer of
heterogeneous items faces potential suppliers from different groups, and the buyer is
constrained to choose a winning list that is consistent with some exogenous quotas as-
signed to the different groups. The optimal allocation rule consists of assigning priority
levels to suppliers on the basis of their cost reports. The way these priority levels are de-
termined is subjective but known to all before the auction. The individual reports induce
scores for each potential winning list. The items are then purchased from one of the lists
with the best score, provided it is not greater than the buyer’s valuation for the items.
Only winning suppliers receive a payment which is at least equal to the highest cost he
could have and still win the auction with certainty. We also find that it is not optimal to
purchase the items through separate auctions, unless the buyer’s valuation is sufficiently
high or low.
3.1 Introduction
Consider a government agency desiring to achieve a project. This project is divided
into subprojects and contracts related to these subprojects are awarded through a pro-
curement auction. Assume that participants are researchers from different provinces of
the country. A government wanting to encourage the research in all the provinces may
design a procurement mechanism so that winners come from all the provinces. Any re-
searcher may be awarded a contract, but some subsets of them are “incompatible” : in
the sense that they may not win the auction together. For example if one province (or
a subset of provinces) has several researchers able to achieve all the subprojects at low
cost, they will never appear in the same winning list because it requires all the provinces.
In the same time the agency may want to encourage competition in order to minimize the
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payment. If the agency awards each contract to researchers who make the lowest bids,
chances are that the winners will not come from all the provinces. Which mechanism
should the agency choose in order to award the contracts ?
Similarly, assume that an international institution has several job positions to be filled
and faces job candidates coming from different states. If the institution is funded by
these states, then the institution may want to hire from all these countries for the sake of
integration of the different states. How should the hiring process be conducted ?
In this paper we study a stylized version of the previous problems. We consider a
buyer seeking to purchase some heterogeneous items and facing potential suppliers be-
longing to different groups. Each supplier may only supply one given item. The items are
complements and the buyer is willing to purchase them through an optimal mechanism
that is, a mechanism that maximizes the buyer’s surplus. As in the above examples, the
buyer’s environment may be (legally) constrained ; typically groups would be assigned
quotas determining the maximal and the minimal number of items purchased from sup-
pliers of a group In parallel, we are also concerned with the optimal mechanism when
the buyer’s environment is not constrained.
Suppliers are assumed to have private information about their supply costs and these
costs are independent. By the revelation principle we may restrict our attention to direct
mechanisms. These are mechanisms in which every supplier is required to submit his
private information prior to the buyer’s decision. Under such mechanisms, given that
their costs are private information, suppliers may not be willing to report honestly their
costs if it is not judged advantageous. We are concerned with incentive compatible me-
chanisms that is, mechanisms in which it is an equilibrium to report honestly the private
information. In addition we focus on mechanisms satisfying the participation constraint :
these are mechanisms in which every supplier who takes part in the procurement expects
a profit at least equal to what he gets if he does not participate. In this context of pri-
vate information the buyer’s objective is actually to optimize the expected value of the
surplus.
This paper is related to the literature on mechanism design. A mechanism is a set
of rules that determines which alternative should be chosen among many. Mechanisms
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may be compared on the basis of their ability to achieve desired goals. These goals would
typically depend on the mechanism’s designer and on the environment ; by this we mean
constraints that may not be modified by the mechanism’s designer such as preferences,
available information, technology limitations, and institutional constraints.
Part of the literature is concerned with social efficiency. For example, among recent
works, Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) suggest the use of a multi-bidding auction to
efficiently choose an alternative among many. In their mechanism agents make multiple
bids (one for every alternative) that must sum up to zero, in addition they each announce
one alternative that helps make the decision in case of tie. Ehlers (2008) uses the same
environment to show the importance to make the additional announcement. 1
In contrast, we are rather interested in maximizing the surplus of the buyer in the
context of a multi unit procurement. We generalize the techniques in Myerson (1981) in
order to derive the optimal mechanism. As in Myerson (1981) the buyer may refuse to
purchase the items if it is not judged advantageous. Branco (1996) characterizes optimal
multi unit auction in the context of homogeneous items, in contrast our model deals
with heterogeneous items. We also make the assumption that the items are complements
from the buyer’s point of view. Optimal multi unit auctions with heterogeneous items
have been widely studied. In these environments each bidder usually may compete for
more than one item. A recurrent theme in these papers is the question of whether to
purchase the items (or sell in the case of direct auctions) in bundle or in many sequential
auctions. Armstrong (2000), Jehiel and moldovanu (2001) show that bundling is optimal
in the case of two items. Levin (1997) studied optimal auction of complements and
showed that it is advantageous to bundle. Another important issue is the dimension of
the information available to bidders (their type). Most of the literature on optimal multi
unit auction assumes multidimensional and discrete types (Armstrong 2000, Avery and
Hendershott 2000). We rather consider one dimensional and continuous types (the unit
costs of the suppliers). All these papers do not study environment where winning lists
are constrained to respect exogenous quotas for groups of suppliers : the topic of this
1. For a good review on the subject of socially efficient (and more generally of) mechanism design see
Jackson (2001), Serrano (2003), or Myerson (2006).
54
paper.
We do not allow suppliers to bid for more than one item. But the fact that the buyer
views the items as complements suggests the possibility to purchase them at a joint auc-
tion. Moreover the presence of a legal constraint that assigns different quotas to groups
of suppliers also seems in favor of a joint auction. Of course it is possible to purchase
the items in a mechanism consisting of many separate auctions as well : we refer to such
mechanisms as itemwise mechanisms. In proposition 15 we provide a necessary condi-
tion for an itemwise mechanism to be optimal : the buyer’s valuation for the items must
be too high or too low. Because of the legal constraint the converse is not in general true,
yet it is true when the environment is unconstrained.
Armantier and Njiki (2008) consider an environment similar to ours : with four sup-
pliers, two groups and two items. Though not searching for optimal auctions they are
interested in some particular auctions. They present two simple constrained mechanisms
and show that they yield lower expected prices than first and second price auctions under
assumptions implying costs correlation or asymmetry. The assumption of costs indepen-
dence made in the present paper is the main difference with their environment, beside
the fact that we allow for many items, suppliers and groups rather than only two items,
four suppliers and two groups as they do.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model
and introduce some useful definitions. In section 3 we clarify which mechanisms are
considered feasible and focus on direct mechanisms. In section 4 the optimal mechanism
is derived and we discuss about conditions under which an itemwise mechanism may be
optimal. Finally an application is considered in section 5 and, Section 7 concludes the
paper.
3.2 The model
We consider a buyer seeking to purchase one unit of L heterogeneous items. There
are n potential suppliers divided into K groups. Let N = {1,2, ...,n} be the set of sup-
pliers. Each supplier supplies exactly one of the heterogeneous items and belongs to
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exactly one group (or country) 2. Let Il be the set of suppliers who may supply item l,
and Ok the set of suppliers coming from country k. The set of suppliers can be portioned
in two different ways :
L∪
l=1
Il =N =
K∪
k=1
Ok (3.1)
With
Il ∩ Il′ = /0 and Ok∩Ok′ = /0, ∀l, l′,k,k′ (3.2)
(3.2) means that every supplier may supply only one item and comes from only one
country. Note that this model allows situations in which some items may not be supplied
in all countries. If supplier i∈N wins the procurement it will cost ci to provide the unit.
But if he looses he suffers no cost. Costs are independently distributed and supplier i’s
cost ci is distributed according to the probability density function fi, and the cumulative
density function Fi with support Γi = [c¯i
, c¯i]. Denote Γ= ×
i∈N
Γi the Cartesian product of
these supports. 3 The costs’ distributions and the countries of the suppliers are common
knowledge to the buyer and the suppliers. Every supplier observes privately his own cost
but not the other suppliers’ costs. There is no cooperation between suppliers. In this set
up the winners of the procurement constitute a subset (a list) of L suppliers such that any
two of them supply different items. We denoteP the collection of all such lists and call
it the set of potential winning lists. The buyer’s utility for purchasing the bundle of items
is v.
There are many different mechanisms to purchase the bundle. For instance, the buyer
may buy the units through L simultaneous first price auctions, one for each item. In this
2. These groups may be built, for example, according to suppliers’ countries or their province of origin
or any other characteristic. To be specific, in what follows, we assume that groups are built according to
suppliers’ countries.
3. In all the paper, scalars and scalar functions are denoted by lowercase letters. Vectors and vector
functions are denoted by boldface lowercase letters. u−i denotes the vector u without the component of
order i : u = (ui,u−i). Conditional expectations are denoted by the uppercase of the same letter e.g. :
X(ci) = Ec−i [x(ci,c−i)].
Finally given a set S, a subset T of S and a vector u =(ui)i∈S, we denote (ui)i∈T the vector obtained
by removing the component of u whose orders are not in T .
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case, suppliers are asked to bid the price they are willing to accept, and the buyer takes
each item from the supplier with the lowest bid among the potential suppliers of the item
at a price equal to the lowest bid. He may also buy each item through a second price
auction (for each item the potential suppliers submit their bids, and the item is bought
from the supplier with the lowest bid at a price equal to the second lowest bid). The buyer
can even practice different kind of auctions on each item. In the mechanisms considered
so far items are bought separately : the buyer’s decision concerning the supplier to whom
he purchases an item and its final unit price is independent on his decision concerning
the supplier to whom he purchases another item and the related price. In that sense,
the procurement of a unit is not related to the procurement of another unit. There exist
mechanisms under which the procurements of the units are not separated. For example,
consider the following constraint (R1) : “the buyer must buy the items from suppliers
coming from all the countries”. LetR1 be the collection of all the potential winning lists
that involve all the countries :R1 ⊂P. The buyer is constrained to purchase only from
the lists inR1.
Example 3. 2 countries, 2 items and 4 suppliers
Here n = 4; suppliers from the first country are in O1 = {1,2}, suppliers from the
second country are in O2 = {3,4} ; suppliers of the first item are in I1 = {1,3} and
suppliers of the second item are in I2 = {2,4} ;
In this case, since there are two items needed, suppliers win the procurement in
pairs : the buyer can only purchase from one of the following pairs {1,2} ,{2,3} ,{3,4}
or {4,1} :P = {{1,2} ,{2,3} ,{3,4} ,{4,1}} .4
Under constraint (R1) the buyer can buy only from the pairs {1, 4} and {2, 3} :
R1 = {{1, 4},{2, 3}} .5 Thus if he buys the first item from supplier 1 he must buy the
second item from supplier 4. An example of mechanism under (R1) is the following :
supplier i submits a bid bi and the units are bought from the pair {1, 4} if b1+b4 <
4. The pair {1,3} is excluded because 1 and 3 sell the same good and the buyer needs only a single
unit of it. {2,4} is excluded for the same reason.
5. The pair {1,2} is excluded because 1 and 2 come from the same country though they sell different
goods. {3,4} is excluded for the same reason.
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b2+b3, and from the pair {2, 3} if b1+b4 > b2+b3. In any case the winners are paid
a price equal to their bid but the other suppliers receive nothing.
We introduce additional definitions.
In a typical procurement mechanism, the buyer first announces the procurement rules
to the suppliers. Suppliers observe privately their own costs and place their bids. Finally
the buyer collects the bids and buys the items according to the rules set before.
Let Ωi be the set of all possible bids for supplier i ∈ N , and let Ω=
n
∏
i=1
Ωi. The
set Ω is determined by the type of information that the buyer requires to each supplier
during the procurement process. So we may assume that the buyer knows the set Ω of
the information he requires. Therefore suppliers cannot bid out of that set.
A strategy for supplier i is a function βi : Γi→Ωi transforming i’s cost into a bid.
An allocation rule is a function q = (qG)G∈P : Ω→ R|P|+ such that :
for any bid vector b ∈Ω, ∑
G∈P
qG(b)≤ 1.
Where qG(b) is the probability that list G wins. ∑
G∈P
qG(b) = 0 would simply mean that
the buyer refuses to purchase the heterogeneous items when the bid vector is b.
The individual allocation rule associated with the allocation rule q is the function
x = (xi)i∈N :Ω→ Rn+ such that :
for any supplier i ∈N and any bid vector b ∈Ω,xi(b) = ∑
G∈P:i∈G
qG(b).
xi(b) is supplier i’s winning probability when the bid vector is b. 6 Note that this
definition implies that ∑
i∈Il
xi(b) = ∑
G∈P
qG(b), ∀l. i.e. all items have the same probability
to be purchased and this probability is the probability to purchase the bundle.
A payment rule is a function t = (ti)i∈N :Ω→ Rn such that ti(b) is the amount of
money paid to supplier i when the bid vector is b. Note that this payment can be negative,
meaning that supplier i will have to make a transfer to the buyer rather than receive from
6. In example 3 , x1(b) = q{1,2}(b)+q{4,1}(b).
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him.
A procurement mechanism is defined by a set of bids, an allocation rule and a pay-
ment rule. We use the notation (Ω,q, t) to refer to a procurement mechanism with a set
of bids Ω, an allocation rule q and a payment rule t. It is important to note that we do
not mention the individual allocation rule in the definition of a mechanism since it is
uniquely determined by the allocation rule. On the contrary a given individual allocation
rule might be associated with many allocation rules. 7
A procurement mechanism (Ω,q, t) is said itemwise if there exists for every item l
two functions σl : ×
i∈Il
Ωi→ R|Il | and θl : ×
i∈Il
Ωi→ R|Il | such that for any b ∈ Ω ,
 (xi(b))i∈Il = σl( (bi)i∈Il)(ti(b))i∈Il = θl( (bi)i∈Il) ,
where x is the individual allocation rule associated with q.
To understand this definition, remember that suppliers in Il are selling the same item ;
the conditions (i.e. allocation and payment) under which one item is purchased depend
solely on the message sent by the potential suppliers of that item and not the message
sent by the suppliers of other items. Therefore an itemwise mechanism is a mechanism
where each item is purchased independently of the others, in a procurement that involves
only the potential suppliers of that particular item.
In this paper the buyer may be (legally) constrained to implement allocation rules of
a certain type. For instance, in example 3, an allocation rule most satisfy the additional
constraint :
for any b ∈Ω and G ∈P\R1, qG(b) = 0.
7. Indeed, using the framework of example 3, let x = (xi)i∈N : Ω→ R4+ be such that x1(b)+ x3(b) =
1 = x2(b)+ x4(b). We will build an allocation rule associated with x. Consider a function µ : Ω→ [0,1]
such that max(0,x3 + x4− 1) ≤ µ ≤ min(x3,x4); µ exists because x3,x4 ∈ [0,1]⇒ 0 ≤ max(0,x3 + x4−
1)≤min(x3,x4)≤ 1.
Take for example q{3,4} = µ;q{4,1} = x4−µ;q{3,2} = x3−µ;q{1,2} = 1− x3− x4+µ;
It is easy to see that qG = 1 and for any G ∈P,qG ≥ 0. Thus q is an allocation rule. Moreover the
individual allocation rule associated with q is precisely x, but the allocation rule q depends on the selection
µ .
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More generally letR be a non empty subset ofP.
An allocation rule q is said R-constrained if the buyer can only purchase from the
lists of suppliers inR :
for any b ∈Ω and G ∈P\R, qG(b) = 0.
A procurement mechanism (Ω,q, t) isR-constrained if q isR-constrained.
If the number of items purchased from suppliers of a group k is constrained to remain
between the exogenous parameters αk and βk then,
R = {G ∈P : αk ≤ |Ok∩G| ≤ βk,∀k ∈ {1,2, ...,K}} . (3.3)
|A| denotes the number of elements of any set A.
We say that the buyer’s environment is unconstrained if he is free to implement any
allocation rule. Note however that an unconstrained mechanism may be viewed as a
P-constrained mechanism.
In the next section we define the set of feasible mechanisms.
3.3 Direct mechanisms
The set of bid vectors Ω can be a complex object, depending on the information
the buyer requires from the suppliers. This makes the problem of optimally choosing a
mechanism difficult. Direct mechanisms are a particular class of mechanisms where each
supplier is asked to directly report his cost. Formally a direct mechanism is a mechanism
where the set of bid vectors is Γ. When (Ω,q, t) is a direct mechanism we shall simply
denote it by (q, t).
3.3.1 The revelation principle
A procurement mechanism induces a game of incomplete information between the
suppliers, and the notion of direct mechanism has been defined in the broader context of
60
games with incomplete information. In such games players observe privately an infor-
mation considered as their types, they send a message and resources are allocated on the
basis of the messages sent and predefined rules. The search for an optimal mechanism
can be simplified if one can restrict attention to direct mechanisms. The well known re-
velation principle allows us to make such a restriction without loss of generality. This
principle states that : given a game of incomplete information and a Bayesian Nash equi-
librium (BNE), 8 there exist a direct mechanism (with the same outcomes as the first
game) for which it is a BNE to report honestly the types. For the interested reader we
provide (in appendix) a version of the proof of the revelation principle in our framework.
Proposition 12. (Revelation principle)
Given a mechanism (Ω,q, t) and a BNE for that mechanism β , there exists a direct
mechanism (q¯, t¯) in which it is an equilibrium for each supplier to report honestly his
cost and the outcomes are the same as in the equilibrium of the first mechanism.
3.3.2 Incentive compatible and individually rational direct mechanisms
Suppliers need not report their true costs in a direct mechanism since this information
is private ; if the buyer cares about truth, he must choose a procurement mechanism that
gives them incentives to do so. This condition imposes further restrictions on mecha-
nisms that may be chosen : a procurement mechanism must be incentive compatible and
individually rational. Before we define these two concepts we need to introduce some
more notations.
Consider a direct mechanism (q, t) with an individual allocation rule x.
Let
Xi(mi) =Γ−i xi(mi,c−i) f−i(c−i)dc−i (3.4)
be the (interim) winning probability of supplier i if he reports the value mi given that the
other suppliers report their true costs.
8. A BNE is a profile of strategies such that each player’s strategy is optimal against the other players’
strategies. We consider interim BNE in which strategies are optimal if they are evaluated when players
observe their private types. For more about BNE of games of incomplete information see for example
(Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)).
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And let
Ti(mi) =Γ−i ti(mi,c−i) f−i(c−i)dc−i (3.5)
be the (interim) expected payment received by supplier i if he reports the value mi given
that the other suppliers report their costs honestly.
The (interim) expected profit of supplier i when he reports mi (rather than ci) and the
other suppliers report their true costs is :
pii(mi,ci) = Ec−i[ti(mi,c−i)− xi(mi,c−i)ci] = Ti(mi)−Xi(mi)ci. (3.6)
In particular :
pii(ci,ci)≡ Ti(ci)−Xi(ci)ci. (3.7)
pii(ci,ci) is the expected profit when supplier i reports his true cost ci. If honesty (re-
porting the true cost) is an equilibrium then pii(ci,ci) is supplier i’s profit at equilibrium.
Xi(ci) and Ti(ci) are respectively the winning probability and the expected payment of
supplier i at equilibrium.
A mechanism is individually rational (IR) if :
for any i ∈N and ci ∈ Γi, pii(ci,ci)≥ 0 . (3.8)
This means that even the suppliers with the worst costs will make non negative profits
if they participate in the procurement honestly when all the other players do so.
A mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) if :
for all i ∈N and ci ∈ Γi, pii(ci,ci) = max
mi∈Γi
pii(mi,ci) = {Ti(mi)−Xi(mi)ci}. (3.9)
This means that reporting honestly his cost give a supplier the highest expected profit
when the other suppliers report their true costs. In other words the mechanism (q, t) is
incentive compatible if honesty is an interim BNE of the game induced by (q, t). The
next proposition characterizes an IC mechanism by the winning probabilities and the
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expected payment functions.
Proposition 13. A mechanism (q, t) is IC if and only if :
for all i ∈N ,
the function Xi is decreasing (3.10)
and,
for all ci ∈ Γi, Ti(ci) = Ti(c¯i)−Xi(c¯i)c¯i+Xi(ci)ci+
∫ c¯i
ci
Xi(z)dz. (3.11)
Thus, when honesty is a BNE, suppliers with the lowest costs have the highest interim
winning probabilities. These winning probabilities determine the expected payments up
to a constant. Equation (3.11) is well known in the literature on auction design as the
revenue equivalence theorem. Proofs are available in appendix.
In the next section we suppose the buyer has the choice of the procurement me-
chanism. We look for mechanisms he may choose in order to maximize his expected
surplus.
3.4 Surplus maximizingR-constrained mechanism
Assume the buyer uses a direct mechanism (q, t) with an individual allocation rule
x. The buyer’s expected surplus when suppliers reveal their true cost vector is
pi0(q, t) = E
{
v( ∑
G∈P
qG(c))− ∑
i∈N
ti(c)
}
.
The buyer’s goal is to design a direct mechanism maximizing this expected surplus
among IC and IR mechanisms.
E ∑
i∈N
ti(c) = ∑
i∈N
E[ti(c)] = ∑
i∈N
EEc−i[ti(ci,c−i)] = ∑
i∈N
ETi(ci)
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using (3.11),
E[Ti(ci)] = Ti(c¯i)−Xi(c¯i)c¯i+
∫ c¯i
c
¯i
Xi(ci)ci fi(ci)dci
+
∫ c¯i
c
¯i
{∫ c¯i
ci
Xi(z)dz
}
fi(ci)dci
Fubini’s theorem implies,
∫ c¯i
c
¯i
{∫ c¯i
ci
Xi(z)dz
}
fi(ci)dci =
∫ c¯i
c
¯i
{∫ z
c
¯i
fi(ci)dci
}
Xi(z)dz
=
∫ c¯i
c
¯i
Fi(z)Xi(z)dz.
Therefore,
E[Ti(ci)] = Ti(c¯i)−Xi(c¯i)c¯i+
∫ c¯i
c
¯i
[Xi(ci) ci fi(ci)+Fi(ci)Xi(ci)]dci
= pii(c¯i, c¯i)+
∫ c¯i
c
¯i
(ci+
Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
)Xi(ci) fi(ci)dci
= pii(c¯i, c¯i)+
∫
Γ
(ci+
Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
)xi(c) f (c)dc (using (3.4)).
It follows that,
E ∑
i∈N
ti(c) = ∑
i∈N
pii(c¯i, c¯i)+
∫
Γ
{
∑
i∈N
Hi(ci)xi(c)
}
f (c)dc (3.12)
where Hi(m) = m+
Fi(m)
fi(m)
for all i ∈N and m ∈ Γi; the function Hi is usually called
the virtual cost of supplier i.
We may also express the expected price in terms of the allocation rule rather than the
individual allocation rule :
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E ∑
i∈N
ti(c) = ∑
i∈N
pii(c¯i, c¯i)+
∫
Γ
{
∑
i∈N
Hi(ci) ∑
G∈P/i∈G
qG(c)
}
f (c)dc
= ∑
i∈N
pii(c¯i, c¯i)+
∫
Γ
{
∑
i∈N
∑
G∈P/i∈G
Hi(ci)qG(c)
}
f (c)dc
= ∑
i∈N
pii(c¯i, c¯i)+
∫
Γ
{
∑
G∈P
∑
i∈G
Hi(ci)qG(c)
}
f (c)dc
= ∑
i∈N
pii(c¯i, c¯i)+
∫
Γ
{
∑
G∈P
qG(c)∑
i∈G
Hi(ci)
}
f (c)dc.
We define the aggregate virtual cost of the list G as SG(c)≡ ∑
i∈G
Hi(ci). Using
Ev( ∑
G∈P
qG(c)) = E ∑
G∈P
qG(c)v =
∫
Γ
∑
G∈P
qG(c)v f (c)dc,
the expected surplus can be written as :
pi0(q, t) =− ∑
i∈N
pii(c¯i, c¯i)+
∫
Γ
{
∑
G∈P
qG(c)(v−SG(c))
}
f (c)dc. (3.13)
For any i∈N , we define the function Ki : [0,1]→R, as Ki(zi)=
∫ F−1i (zi)
0 Hi(t) fi(t)dt.
Note that K′i (Fi(ci)) = Hi(ci).
Let Kˆi : [0,1]→ R be the convex hull 9 of Ki. Kˆi is differentiable almost surely. Let
Hˆi : Γi→ R be such that Hˆi(ci) = Kˆ′i (Fi(ci)).
Hˆi(ci) is called the ironed out virtual cost of supplier i and it should be understood
as a “priority level” assigned to supplier i when his cost is ci ; These priority levels are
subjective and induce a score for each list of suppliers : SˆG(c)≡ ∑
i∈G
Hˆi(ci).
9. i.e. the greatest convex function g : [0,1]→ R such that g(zi)≤ Ki(zi), for any zi ∈ [0,1] .
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Let
pˆi0(q, t) =− ∑
i∈N
pii(c¯i, c¯i)+
∫
Γ
{
∑
G∈P
qG(c)v
}
f (c)dc−
∫
Γ
{
∑
i∈N
Hˆi(ci)xi(c)
}
f (c)dc.
(3.14)
pˆi0 is obtained from the expression of pi0 by replacing virtual costs by the ironed out
virtual costs. Thus we can also write :
pˆi0(q, t) =− ∑
i∈N
pii(c¯i, c¯i)+
∫
Γ
{
∑
G∈P
qG(c)(v− SˆG(c))
}
f (c)dc. (3.15)
The following three properties of convex hulls are well known :
(a) Kˆi(0) = Ki(0) and Kˆi(1) = Ki(1),
(b) Kˆi(zi)≤ Ki(zi) for any zi ∈ [0,1] ,
(c) if Kˆi(zi) < Ki(zi) then Kˆ′i is constant in some neighborhood of zi ; hence Hˆi is
constant in some neighborhood of F−1i (zi).
We are now ready to state our main result. The allocation rule and the payment rule
we define just below are optimal in anR-constrained environment ( /0 R ⊂P).
For any m ∈Γ, we define the following set :
AR(m) =
{
G ∈R : SˆG(m) = min
{
SˆG′(m) : G′ ∈R
}}
.
This set is well defined since R is finite and it represents the collection of all the po-
tential lists of suppliers having the minimum score among the lists which do not violate
the constraint. Thus all the lists in AR(m) have the same score. Hereafter we refer to
elements of AR(m) as minimal lists, and we call AR(m) the set of minimal lists when
reported cost is m.
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We define the following allocation rule qR : for any m ∈Γ and G ∈P,
qRG (m) =

0 if G /∈ AR(m)
0 if G ∈ AR(m) and SˆG(m)> v
1
|AR(m)| if G ∈ AR(m) and SˆG(m)≤ v
(3.16)
Note that qR is R-constrained by definition. Under this allocation rule the buyer
purchases from a list of potential suppliers with the lowest score among all the potential
lists of suppliers which do not violate the constraint, provided that the lowest score be at
most equal to the buyer’s valuation of the bundle of items. The items are purchased from
any of the minimal lists equiprobably, in case there are many such lists. Observe also that
the buyer will not purchase the items when the minimum score exceeds his valuation.
Given a bid vector m ∈Γ the probability to purchase the items is
∑
G∈P
qRG (m) =
 0 if v < minG∈RSˆG(m)1 otherwise . (3.17)
Let xR be the individual allocation rule associated with qR ; xR is such that, for any
m ∈Γ,
xRi (m) = ∑
G∈R/i∈G
qRG (m). (3.18)
We also define the following payment rule :
for any m ∈Γ, tRi (m) = xRi (m)mi+
∫ c¯i
mi
xRi (t,m−i)dt. (3.19)
A payment of xRi (m)mi would mean that supplier i receives an amount equal to his
announced cost if he wins the procurement. Beside this, the payment rule t involves
an additional rent
∫ c¯i
mi x
R
i (t,m−i)dt necessary to cause suppliers to reveal their private
information honestly.
Remark 1. In particular tRi (c¯i,m−i) = xRi (c¯i,m−i)c¯i for all m−i ∈ Γ−i. Then taking the
expectation we have TRi (c¯i) = X
R
i (c¯i)c¯i. Thus the expected profit of supplier i with costs
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c¯i when he bids honestly is piRi (c¯i, c¯i)= TRi (c¯i)−XRi (c¯i)c¯i = 0. A consequence is that the
mechanism (qR , tR) always yields a worse expected profit than any individually rational
mechanism (q , t) for the supplier i with costs c¯i when he bids honestly : pii(c¯i, c¯i)≥ 0 =
piRi (c¯i, c¯i).
The following results shows that the previous mechanism is optimal.
Theorem 2. The direct mechanism (qR , tR)maximizes the expected surplus of the buyer
among calR-constrained mechanisms that are IC and IR. The maximum expected surplus
is given by ρR(v) = E
[
max
[
0,v−min{SˆG(c) : G ∈R}]] .
Note that, as expected, ρR(v)≤ ρR′(v) ifR ⊂R ′, i.e. the buyer’s expected surplus
decreases when the environment becomes more constrained. Moreover the allocation
rule and the expected surplus increase with v : a buyer with a high valuation for the
bundle purchases more often and expect more surplus than a buyer with a lower valua-
tion.
The proof of the theorem is available in appendix and relies on the following results.
Lemma 4. Let i ∈N , m−i ∈ Γ−i and u¯ ∈ Γi.
If i ∈ G and G ∈ AR(u¯,m−i) then, for every u¯ ∈ Γi : u¯ >u¯ , G ∈ A
R(u
¯
,m−i) and
AR(u
¯
,m−i)⊂ AR(u¯,m−i).
This lemma shows that if a supplier appears in a minimal list with some reported
cost, then the list would remain a minimal list if this supplier reported a lower cost while
the other suppliers do not change their reports ; Moreover every minimal list would still
be minimal if only one supplier changes his report.
The implication u
¯
< u¯⇒ AR(u
¯
,m−i) ⊂ AR(u¯,m−i) is not true in general. The pre-
vious lemma provides a sufficient condition for it.
The following lemma is a corollary of lemma 4. It is useful to establish that the
mechanism (qR , tR) is IC using proposition 13.
Lemma 5. For any i ∈N and m−i ∈ Γ−i, the functions qRG (.,m−i) (where G ∈R : i ∈
G), xRi (.,m−i) and XRi (.) are decreasing.
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Finally the following lemma compares the expected surplus pi0(q, t) and the modified
expected surplus pˆi0(q, t) under an IC mechanism.
Lemma 6. for any IC mechanism (q, t) : pˆi0(q, t)≥ pi0(q, t).
3.4.1 Unconstrained environment
Theorem 2 applies in particular in the unconstrained environment, i.e. whenR =P .
If L = 1 we fall in the context of a single unit auction.P is simply the collection of
all the singletons ofN , and the scores are simply virtual costs :
Sˆ{i}(m) = Hˆi(mi).
The set AP(m) is the collection of all the potential suppliers who have the minimum
virtual cost :
AP(m) =
{
i ∈N : Hˆi(mi) = min
{
Hˆ j(m j) : j ∈N
}}
.
The allocation rule and the individual allocation rule are the same (see below). The
buyer purchases from a supplier with the lowest virtual cost provided that this virtual
cost be at most equal to the buyer’s valuation of the single item. When there are many
suppliers with the lowest virtual cost he purchases from any one of them with the same
probability. The buyer does not purchase the items when the minimum virtual cost ex-
ceeds his valuation.
qP{i}(m) = x
P
i (m) =

0 if i /∈ AP(m)
0 if i ∈ AP(m) and Hˆi(mi)> v
1
|AR(m)| if i ∈ AP(m) and Hˆi(mi)≤ v
and the payment rule is deduce from this allocation rule. Myerson (1981) designed
an optimal mechanism in the context of a single unit auction, our optimal mechanism is
simply the procurement version of his mechanism. Our result thus generalizes his.
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Below we provide an explicit formula for the individual allocation rule when there is
more than one item to buy (L≥ 2).
For any item l we define the set of all the suppliers who have the minimum virtual
cost among the potential suppliers of that item :
Al(m) =
{
i ∈ Il : Hˆi(mi) = min
{
Hˆ j(m j) : j ∈ Il
}}
. (3.20)
The following proposition gives an explicit formula for the individual allocation of
the mechanism (qP , tP) : the unconstrained surplus maximizing mechanism.
Proposition 14. The individual allocation rule of the unconstrained surplus maximizing
mechanism (qP , tP) is given by the equalities :
xPi (m) =

0 if i /∈ Al(m)
0 if i ∈ Al(m) and min
G∈P
SˆG(m)> v
1
|Al(m)| if i ∈ Al(m) and minG∈PSˆG(m)≤ v
Remember that under the mechanism (qP , tP) the buyer purchases the items if and
only if the minimum score does not exceeds his valuation : min
G∈P
SˆG(m)≤ v.
The expression of the individual allocation rule shows that when the buyer decides
to purchase the items, item l is purchased equiprobably from suppliers who have the
minimum virtual cost among potential suppliers of that item. It is true that the set Al(m)
depends only on the bids of suppliers of item l. But in general the minimum score would
depend on other suppliers’ bids as well. Hence xPi (m) would not depend on the bids of
suppliers of item l solely. This means that (qP , tP) is not itemwise 10 in general. The
main reason lies on the fact that the heterogeneous items are complements. The buyer
needs them altogether. He has a valuation for the bundle and not for particular items. An
itemwise mechanism would have to meet this requirement. This implies more costs. We
further discuss this subject when the environment is constrained in the next section.
10. See section 2 for a definition.
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3.4.2 Itemwise mechanisms
This section examines the possibility for an itemwise mechanism to be optimal in a
constrained environment. We’ve already shown that the optimal unconstrained mecha-
nism is not itemwise in general. But this alone does not rule out the possibility for some
other optimal mechanism to be itemwise. Indeed theorem 2 does not claim the unicity of
the optimal solution. We argue below that itemwise mechanisms would not be optimal in
general, and we provide a necessary condition for the existence of an optimal mechanism
that is also itemwise.
First we must observe that the itemwise property of a mechanism carries to his equi-
valent direct mechanism. This can be seen through the proof of the revelation principle
provided in appendix. So when we are dealing with an itemwise mechanism we may
assume without loss that it is a direct mechanism.
Let (q, t) be an itemwise mechanism and let x be the associated individual allocation
rule. By definition of an allocation rule the probability to purchase an item is the same
for all items : it is simply the probability to purchase the bundle. Formally :
∑
i∈Il
xi(c) = ∑
G∈R
qG(c),∀c ∈ Γ.
Now, because the mechanism is itemwise, the probability to purchase an item l from
a supplier i only depends on bids of suppliers of that item xi(c) = xi((ci)i∈Il). Thus the
probability to purchase the bundle itself depends solely on bids by suppliers of item l.
Since item l is arbitrary, and since the sets Il form a partition of the set of suppliers, we
conclude that the probability to purchase is constant : ∑
G∈R
qG(c) is constant.
We learn from the proof of theorem 2 that, with an optimal allocation rule, the ex-
pected profit of the buyer when costs vector is c must be :
∑
G∈R
qG(c)(v− SˆG(c)) = max
{
0,
(
(v− SˆG(c))
)
G∈R
}
almost surely (a.s).
This implies that the allocation rule eventually gives positive probability only to the
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maximal elements of the finite sequence
{
0,
(
(v− SˆG(c))
)
G∈R
}
. So,
if G 6∈ AR(c) then qG(c) = 0.
All this implies that
∑
G∈R
qG(c)(v− SˆG(c)) = ∑
G∈AR(c)
qG(c)(v− SˆG(c)).
Given that for any G ∈ AR(c) we have SˆG(c) = min
G∈R
SˆG(c), we conclude that
∑
G∈R
qG(c)(v− SˆG(c)) = (v−min
G∈R
SˆG(c)) ∑
G∈AR(c)
qG(c) (a.s).
The same is true for mechanism (qR , tR) and therefore :
(v−min
G∈R
SˆG(c))
 ∑
G∈AR(c)
qG(c)− ∑
G∈AR(c)
qRG (c)
= 0 (a.s).
Recall that under (qR , tR) the probability to purchase depends on the sign of v−
min
G∈R
SˆG(c) (i.e. ∑
G∈AR(c)
qRG (c) = 1(minG∈R
SˆG(c)≤ v)) ; under (q , t) however the probability
to purchase is a constant ρ . We deduce
(v−min
G∈R
SˆG(c))
[
ρ−1(min
G∈R
SˆG(c)≤ v)
]
= 0 (a.s).
This implies that
min
G∈R
SˆG(c)≤ v (a.s) or min
G∈R
SˆG(c)≥ v (a.s). (3.21)
Hence the buyer’s valuation most be too “high” or too “low”.
Proposition 15. There exists an itemwise mechanism that maximizes the buyer’s expec-
ted surplus only if his valuation (almost) never falls short of the minimum score, or it
is (almost) never higher than the minimum score, of the potential lists satisfying the
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constraint. Therefore, when conditions (3.21) are not satisfied, the buyer would prefer to
purchase the items in a joint auction rather than through separated auctions.
Note that in case the buyer’s valuation is “high enough”, he almost surely purchases
the items. In this case maximizing the surplus is simply equivalent to minimizing the
payment for purchasing the items. On the contrary if his valuation is not enough high he
will not purchase the items.
In general we cannot tell if the converse is true when the environment is constrained.
But if the environment is unconstrained the converse is true. Indeed assume that the
buyer’s valuation is high enough i.e. min
G∈R
SˆG(c) ≤ v (a.s). Then proposition 14 shows
that the individual allocation rule xPi is almost surely equal to the individual allocation
rule x∞i , where
x∞i (m) =
 0 if i /∈ Al(m)1|Al(m)| if i ∈ Al(m) ,
and x∞i is itemwise. Hence the optimal unconstrained mechanism (qP , tP) is almost
surely equal to an itemwise mechanism when the buyer’s valuation is high enough.
3.5 Example : power distributions
This section is an illustration of our results in the context of the example 3 given in
the beginning of the paper.
We suppose c
¯i
= 0 and c¯i = 1, Fi(ci) = (ci )ai and ai ≥ 1 for all i ∈N and ci ∈ Γi.
The probability density functions are given by fi(ci) = ai (ci)
ai−1, and the virtual cost of
supplier i is
Hi(ci) = ci+
Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
= (1+
1
ai
)ci = εici.
Since Hi is increasing we have
Hi = Hˆi.
An increase in ai (a decrease in εi) results in a decrease of Fi(c) which is the proba-
bility that supplier i’s cost be lower than c. Thus the parameter ai somehow describes the
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technology level of supplier i. The higher ai the worse i’s technology.
We assume that the buyer faces the constraint to purchase from suppliers coming
from all the countries. The surplus maximizing mechanism of a buyer with valuation v
is given below. The allocation rule qR is such that, for any m ∈Γ :

qR{1,4}(m) = 1 if ε1m1+ ε4m4 < min [ε2m2+ ε3m3,v]
qR{1,4}(m) = q
R
{2,3}(m) =
1
2 if ε1m1+ ε4m4 = ε2m2+ ε3m3 ≤ v
qR{2,3}(m) = 1 if ε2m2+ ε3m3 < min [ε1m1+ ε4m4,v] .
Note also that the individual allocation rule is such that : xR1 (m)= x
R
4 (m)= q
R
{1,4}(m)
and xR2 (m) = x
R
3 (m) = q
R
{2,3}(m).
The items are purchased from the list with the smallest weighted sum of reports, if
this weighted sum does not exceed the valuation. Reports’ weights are subjective and
equal εi for supplier i. Low technology suppliers are advantaged by the optimal mecha-
nism.
3.6 Conclusion
Most of the literature on procurement auctions does not consider environments where
winning lists most respect exogenous quotas for different groups of suppliers. However
there are situations in life where such restrictions apply. In this paper we have derived
a procurement mechanism maximizing the expected surplus of a buyer in an environ-
ment constrained by restrictions such as the “quotas restriction” and where suppliers’
information is independent and private. An optimal allocation rule consists of assigning
priority levels to suppliers on the basis of their cost report. The way these priority levels
are determined is subjective but known to all before the auction. The individual reports
induce scores for each potential winning list by summing the priority levels of suppliers
in the list. The items are then (equiprobably) purchased from one of the lists with the
best score, provided it is not greater than the buyer’s valuation for the items. Payments
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are only made to suppliers who win the auction. Our optimal mechanism generalizes
Myerson (1981) concerning both the allocation and the payment rules.
In general it is not optimal to purchase the items through separate auctions. Unless
the buyer’s valuation for the items is high (so that he cannot reliably commit to not
purchase) or too low (when he cannot reliably commit to purchase) it is not optimal to
purchase separately. Conversely when the environment is unconstrained, i.e. when one is
free to purchase from any list, it is optimal for a high value buyer to purchase the items
separately.
In the particular case of power distributions, each supplier is assigned a specific
weight : This weight describes the technology level of the supplier : the higher a sup-
plier’s weight, the better his technology. The score of a list is simply the weighted sum
of the reports by suppliers of that list. Lists with low weighted sum have the priority ;
hence the optimal allocation rule advantages low technology suppliers. The buyer cannot
reliably commit to not purchase when his valuation is higher than the priority level of
the best list, when all suppliers have their worst (highest) possible unit cost.
Future directions of research may include relaxing the assumption of independent
costs and allow in the model situations where some suppliers may supply more than
one item. We also assumed that supplier’s do not act in cooperation ; it would also be
interesting to analyze an environment where suppliers may act in a concerted way.
CONCLUSION
Le premier essai a analysé le problème de choisir une alternative pour un groupe
d’agents ayant des informations privées et des intérêts divers. L’objectif du concepteur
était de maximiser le surplus collecté des agents parmi les mécanismes efficaces qui in-
duisent une participation honnête de tous les agents. Dans cet environnement, les agents
qui ne participent pas au processus de décision pourraient néanmoins être affectés par la
décision finale. En plus d’une règle d’attribution et d’une règle de paiement, le concep-
teur peut choisir des menaces appropriées pour chaque agents dans le but de les inciter
à participer et de maximiser son propre surplus espéré. Puisqu’un agent qui ne participe
pas ne révèle pas son information privée, le planificateur décide de lui même ce qu’il
considérera comme tel si un agent venait à ne pas participer, et menace de choisir l’al-
ternative qui donnerait la plus mauvaise utilité à cet agent sous ces conditions. Un choix
de type max-min du type présumé et de la menace permettent de maximiser le surplus
espéré du planificateur parmi les mécanismes efficaces induisant la participation honnête
de tous les agents. Je fournis également un résultat d’existence pour une fonction d’uti-
lité extérieure qui peut être décomposée en deux composantes additives : l’une exogène
et l’autre endogène. J’applique ces résultats à la conception d’une enchère multiple effi-
cace dans un environnement où un acheteur en possession du bien cause des externalités
négatives sur les autres agents. Je montre qu’une généralisation de l’enchère de Vickrey
maximise le surplus parmi mécanismes efficaces induisant une participation honnête.
D’autres applications possibles incluent la localisation d’équipements nocifs, les élec-
tions, le lieu de déroulement de manifestations sportives, la vente d’armes nucléaires
etc.
Dans certaines situations le planificateur aimerait exécuter un mécanisme qui laisse-
rait toujours sa balance en équilibre (surplus nul). De tels mécanismes sont dit de budgets
équilibrés. l’existence de tels mécanismes est déterminée par le signe du surplus espéré
maximal. Nous argumentons que l’existence des mécanismes de budgets équilibrés par
budget est garantie si n’importe quel mécanisme efficace induisant la participation hon-
nête de tous les agents a comme conséquence un surplus espéré positif. Ceci peut être
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utile dans des applications où une forme analytique pour le surplus maximum ne peut
pas être trouvée. Dans de telles applications il est suffisant d’avoir une bonne approxi-
mation du mécanisme optimal, laquelle donnerait lieu à un surplus espéré positif. Cette
approximation peut alors être utilisée pour construire un mécanisme de budget-équilibré.
Dans le deuxième essai nous avons prouvé qu’une exécution appropriée de la règle
du juste retour peut la rendre moins coûteuse que les enchères traditionnelles de libre
concurrence (enchères premier prix et deuxième prix). Nous avons considéré le cas de
l’information complète (pour l’enchère des premiers prix) où les niveaux de technologie
des firmes sont de notoriété publique, et le cas de l’information incomplète (pour enchère
de deuxième prix) où les sociétés observent en privé leurs coûts de production. Dans les
deux des cas nous avons identifié une enchère sous le principe du juste retour qui tire
avantage des asymétries entre les pays et est moins coûteuse que l’enchère traditionnelle.
Le prix (resp. prix espéré) des articles sous la règle du juste retour est inférieure au prix
sous l’enchère traditionnelle dans les situations où (resp. l’agence croit que) : un état
possède un niveau de technologie plus élevé pour la production des articles que l’autre,
et de plus les avantages de chacun des fournisseurs de l’état en avance (comparé à ceux
de leurs adversaires directs respectivement) sont suffisamment proches l’un de l’autre.
Nous avons également supposé que l’agence n’impose pas des prix de réserve. Cette
hypothèse peut être justifiée par le fait que la valeur que l’agence attribue aux articles est
reconnue pour être trop haute en comparaison des coûts des fournisseurs. De sorte que
l’acheteur ne puisse pas s’engager de façon crédible à ne pas du tout acheter les articles.
Toutefois il serait intéressant de comparer les deux principes dans un modèle qui tient
compte des prix de réserve.
Le troisième essai élabore un mécanisme d’appel d’offre maximisant le surplus es-
péré d’un acheteur dans un environnement contraint par des quotas pour chacun des
différent groupes d’agents y participant. Une règle optimale d’allocation consiste en
l’attribution de niveaux de priorité aux fournisseurs sur la base des coûts unitaires qu’ils
rapportent au décideur. Les coûts rapportés induisent des scores pour chaque potentielle
listes de gagnant, obtenus en additionnant les niveaux de priorité des fournisseurs dans la
liste. Les articles sont alors achetés d’une des listes ayant le meilleur score, pourvu qu’il
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ne soit pas plus grand que la valeur que l’acheteur attribue aux articles. Des paiements
sont seulement effectués aux fournisseurs qui gagnent l’enchère. Notre mécanisme opti-
mal est une généralisation de Myerson (1981).
En général il n’est pas optimal d’acheter les articles par enchères séparées, à moins
que la valeur que l’acheteur attribue aux articles ne soit trop haute (de sorte qu’il ne
peut pas s’engager de façon crédible à ne pas acheter) soit trop basse (quand il ne peut
pas s’engager de façon crédible à l’achat). Réciproquement quand l’environnement n’est
pas contraint, c.-à-d. quand on est libre d’acheter de n’importe quelle liste, il est optimal
qu’un acheteur de valeurs élevées achète les articles séparément.
Dans le cas particulier où les coûts suivent une distribution “puissance”, à chaque
fournisseur est assignée un poids : Ce poids décrit le niveau de technologie du four-
nisseur : le plus haut est le poids meilleur est la technologie. Le score d’une la liste est
simplement la somme pondérés des couts rapportés par les fournisseurs de cette liste. Les
listes ayant la somme la plus basse ont la priorité ; par conséquent cette règle quoique
optimale favorise les fournisseurs les moins avancés technologiquement.
Nous avons supposé tout au long de cette thèse que les agents ou les fournisseurs
n’agissent pas en coopération et que leurs types sont indépendants les uns des autres.
Il serait également intéressant d’analyser un environnement où ils peuvent agir d’une
manière concertée d’une part et d’autre part où leurs types sont plus ou moins corrélés.
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Annexe I
Appendix to chapter 2
Proof of proposition 6. For the FP auction the argument is this : the supplier with the
lowest cost, having more latitude to place low bid than his opponent, maximizes his
profit by bidding just above his opponent’s cost. If the opponent then bids his own cost,
we have an equilibrium provided that the difference between the costs is not small. In
this last case an equilibrium is to bid the highest cost for both suppliers.
We prove the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) for the FR auction by assuming
without loss of generality that c1+c4+ γ = c2+c3 with γ ≥ 0. There are only to cases :
γ ≤ 2ε or γ ≥ 3ε .
If γ ≤ 2ε then b∗1 = c1+ γ and b∗i = ci for i 6= 1 is a NE. Indeed, we have b∗1+b∗4 =
b∗2+b
∗
3 and this implies that no supplier has incentive to increase his bid since this would
weaken his pair and cause him to lose certainly. In addition, only supplier 1 may consider
to reduce his bid ; if he does reduce his bid of ε then his profit decreases from 12γ to γ−ε .
If γ ≥ 3ε then b∗1 = c1+ γ − 2ε,b∗4 = c4+ ε and b∗i = ci for i = 2,3 is a NE. With
such bids we have b∗1 + b
∗
4 + ε = b
∗
2 + b
∗
3 so that the auction is won by the pair {1,4}
and none of suppliers 2 and 3 have incentive to increase their bids ; they cannot reduce
their bid since it would lead to a negative profit. Supplier 4, whose profit is ε, makes a
worse profit if he increases his bid of more than ε or decreases it. If he increases his bid
of ε his profit remains the same ε . Similarly, supplier 1, whose profit is γ−2ε, makes a
worse profit if he increases his bid of more than ε or decreases it. If he increases his bid
of ε his new profit is 12(γ− ε); which is less than γ−2ε . So no supplier has incentive to
change his bid given the others’ bids.
Proof of lemma 3. (i) The argument is this : supplier with the lowest cost, having
more latitude to place low bid than his opponent, maximizes his profit by bidding
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just above his opponent’s cost. Note however that if the difference between the
costs is small, it is possible to have an equilibrium where the supplier with the
lowest cost submits a bid just equal to his opponent’s cost.
(ii) let (b∗i )i∈N be a Nash equilibrium. The total price of the items is f r =min(b∗1+
b∗4,b
∗
2 + b
∗
3). We will show that f r ≤ 4ε +max(c1 + c4,c2 + c3) when b∗1 + b∗4 =
b∗2+b
∗
3 and b
∗
1+b
∗
4 < b
∗
2+b
∗
3. The case b
∗
1+b
∗
4 > b
∗
2+b
∗
3 is similar to the last one.
- Suppose b∗1 + b
∗
4 = b
∗
2 + b
∗
3 ; supplier i’s profit is
1
2(b
∗
i − ci) and we have 12(b∗i −
ci) ≥ (b∗i − ε − ci) since he has no interest in changing his bid to b∗i − ε . This implies
successively b∗i ≤ 2ε + ci for any i, b∗1 + b∗4 ≤ 4ε + c1 + c4 and b∗2 + b∗3 ≤ 4ε + c2 + c3,
and finally f r ≤ 4ε+max(c1+ c4,c2+ c3).
- Suppose b∗1+b
∗
4 < b
∗
2+b
∗
3 ; then suppliers 2 and 3 both have zero profit. If supplier
2 changes his bid to b∗2− ε then his profit ((b∗2− ε− c2) or 12(b∗2− ε− c2) in case of tie)
remains non positive. therefore b∗2 ≤ ε+c2. The same argument leads to b∗3 ≤ ε+c3. So
b∗2+b
∗
3 ≤ 2ε+ c2+ c3 ≤ 2ε+max(c1+ c4,c2+ c3) and the result follows.
Proof of proposition 9. We assume that c1 + c4 ≤ c3 + c2, then c1− c3 ≤ c2− c4. The
proof is similar in the case c1+ c4 ≥ c3+ c2.
If c1−c3≤ c2−c4 < 0 then 2δ (c) = 3[(c2−c4)−(c1−c3)]−(c3−c1)−(c4−c2) =
−2(c1−c3)+4(c2−c4) and c1−c3c2−c4 ≥ 1; Thus s f r(c)−sp(c)< 0 if and only if
c1−c3
c2−c4 < 2.
if 0< c1−c3≤ c2−c4 then 2δ (c) = 3[(c2−c4)−(c1−c3)]−(c1−c3)−(c2−c4) =
−4(c1− c3)+ 2(c2− c4) and c1−c3c2−c4 ≤ 1; in this case s f r(c)− sp(c) < 0 if and only if
c1−c3
c2−c4 >
1
2 .
if c1−c3≤ 0≤ c2−c4, then 2δ (c) = 3[(c2−c4)−(c1−c3)]+(c1−c3)−(c2−c4) =
−2(c1− c3)+2(c2− c4)≥ 0; So that s f r(c)− sp(c)≥ 0.
In all this cases the equivalence [s f r(c)− sp(c)< 0⇔ 12 < c1−c3c2−c4 < 2] is true, thus it
is always true.
Proof of proposition 11. We first prove that (i) and (ii) are equivalent.
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(i)⇒(ii) Suppose λ (N) = 0 ; then µ(N) = 0 because µ is absolutely continuous with
respect to the lebesgue measure λ ; therefore
∫
N |δ |dµ = 0 and, using (2.14), s f r−
sp =
∫
P |δ |dµ ≥ 0.
(ii)⇒(i) Suppose λ (N)> 0. We will show that there exist a measure µ with support
T such that
∫
T δdµ =
∫
P |δ |dµ −
∫
N |δ |dµ < 0. Consider any measure µ0 with
support T . If
∫
T δdµ0 < 0 then simply use µ = µ0. Assume now that
∫
T δdµ0 ≥ 0.
Let µ1 be the uniform distribution on N. It is well defined because λ (N) > 0 ;
moreover
∫
P |δ |dµ1 = 0 and
∫
T δdµ1 =−
∫
N |δ |dµ1 < 0. Define µ = (1−θ)µ0+
θµ1. We have
∫
T δdµ = (1− θ)
∫
T δdµ0 + θ
∫
T δdµ1 and it is negative for θ ∈
(0,1) chosen sufficiently close to 1. Moreover the support of (1−θ)µ0 +θµ1 is
necessarily T .
(ii)⇔(iii) let x = c1− c3 and y = c2− c4 then N has a positive measure if the image
set I =
{
(x,y) ∈ D : 12y < x < 2y
}
has positive measure. Where D is the rectangu-
lar [x
¯
, x¯]× [y
¯
, y¯], with x
¯
=c
¯1
− c¯3, x¯ = c¯1− c¯3, y¯
=c
¯2
− c¯4 and y¯ = c¯2− c¯4. Consider
below the graphic for the set
{
(x,y) ∈ D : 12y < x < 2y
}
:
itbpF3.2249in2.4249in0inregion.eps
The bounds x
¯
, x¯,y
¯
and y¯ can take any value provided that the intersection of the region
R and of the rectangular [x
¯
, x¯]× [y
¯
, y¯] have a positive measure. We see that a necessary
and sufficient condition for this intersection to have a positive measure is
 x¯≥ 0y
¯
≤ 0
or x¯ ≤ 0y¯≥ 0 . The result follows.
Proposition 16. Let ∆(c) = max(c1+ c4,c3+ c2)−max(c1,c3)−max(c2,c4).
We have
∆(c) =
 −min(|c1− c3|, |c2− c4|) if c1− c3 and c2− c4 have the same sign0 otherwise
Proof. Without loss of generality we may assume that c1+c4 ≤ c3+c2 (or equivalently
c1− c3 ≤ c2− c4).
If c1− c3 ≤ c2− c4 ≤ 0 then ∆(c) = c3+ c2− c3− c4 = c2− c4 =−|c2− c4|;
xv
if 0≤ c1− c3 ≤ c2− c4 then ∆(c) = c3+ c2− c1− c2 = c3− c1 =−|c1− c3|;
if c1− c3 and c2− c4 have opposite signs, i.e. if c1− c3 < 0 < c2− c4, then ∆(c) =
c3+ c2− c3− c2 = 0.
Annexe II
Appendix to Chapter 3
Proof of the revelation principle. Consider a mechanism (Ω,q, t) and an equilibrium β ,
define
q¯G(c) = qG(β (c)) and t¯i(c) = ti(β (c));
And let x¯ be the individual allocation mechanism associated with q¯.
Suppose that under the direct mechanism (q¯, t¯) the other suppliers (than i) report
their true costs, supplier i’s expected profit when he bids mi ∈ Γi rather than the true cost
ci is :
Ec−i[t¯i(mi,c−i)− x¯i(mi,c−i)ci];
And we have,
t¯i(mi,c−i)− x¯i(mi,c−i)ci = ti(β (mi,c−i))− xi(β (mi,c−i))ci
= ti(βi(mi),β−i(c−i))− xi(βi(mi),β−i(c−i))ci.
Observe that Ec−i[ti(βi(mi),β−i(c−i))− xi(βi(mi),β−i(c−i))ci] is supplier i’s expec-
ted profit when he bids βi(mi), and the other suppliers strategy is β−i under the mecha-
nism (Ω,q, t). Since β is an equilibrium,
Ec−i[ti(βi(mi),β−i(c−i))− xi(βi(mi),β−i(c−i))ci]
≤ Ec−i[ti(βi(ci),β−i(c−i))− xi(βi(ci),β−i(c−i))ci]
= Ec−i[t¯i(ci,c−i)− x¯i(ci,c−i)ci].
Thus,
Ec−i[t¯i(mi,c−i)− x¯i(mi,c−i)ci]≤ Ec−i[t¯i(ci,c−i)− x¯i(ci,c−i)ci],
implying that supplier i’s best response is to report his true cost.
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Proof of proposition 13. Denote p¯ii(ci)≡ pii(ci,ci). If (q, t) is an IC mechanism then the
functions p¯ii are convex. Indeed let λ ∈ [0,1], and u,w ∈ Γi :
p¯ii(λu+(1−λ )w) = max
mi∈Γi
{Ti(mi)−Xi(mi)(λu+(1−λ )w)}
= max[
mi∈Γi
λ{Ti(mi)−Xi(mi)u}+(1−λ ){Ti(mi)−Xi(mi)w}]
≤ λ max
mi∈Γi
{Ti(mi)−Xi(mi)u}+(1−λ )max
mi∈Γi
{Ti(mi)−Xi(mi)w}
= λp¯ii(u)+(1−λ )p¯ii(w)
p¯ii (being convex) is differentiable almost everywhere in the interior of its domain
and the derivative is increasing. The envelope theorem applied to condition (3.9) implies
that :
p¯i ′i (ci) =−Xi(ci). (II.1)
Thus −Xi is increasing and therefore Xi is decreasing.
(II.1) also implies that :
p¯i ′i (ci) = p¯ii(c¯i)+
∫ c¯i
ci
Xi(z)dz. (II.2)
Replacing p¯ii(ci) by Ti(ci)−Xi(ci)ci leads to (3.11).
Conversely, from (3.11) we can have the expressions of Ti(ci) and Ti(mi). Substitu-
ting these expressions in what follows, we have :
[Ti(ci)−Xi(ci)ci]− [Ti(mi)−Xi(mi)ci] =
∫ mi
ci
Xi(z)dz−Xi(mi)(mi− ci),
or equivalently,
pii(ci,ci)− [Ti(mi)−Xi(mi)ci] =
∫ mi
ci
Xi(z)dz−Xi(mi)(mi− ci).
This last expression is positive if the function Xi is decreasing. Therefore condition
(3.9) holds and the mechanism is IC.
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Proof of lemma 4. We start by showing that if G∈AR(u¯,c−i)⇒G∈AR(u¯ ,c−i) ; indeed
if G ∈ AR(u¯,c−i) then by definition SˆG(u¯,c−i) = min
{
SˆG′(u¯,c−i) : G′ ∈R
}
. Fix some
G′ ∈calR ;
if i ∈ G′ then from SˆG(u¯,c−i)≤ SˆG′(u¯,c−i), we deduce successively :
Hˆi(u¯)+ ∑
j∈G/ j 6=i
Hˆ j(c j) ≤ Hˆi(u¯)+ ∑
j∈G′/ j 6=i
Hˆ j(c j),
∑
j∈G/ j 6=i
Hˆ j(c j) ≤ ∑
j∈G′/ j 6=i
Hˆ j(c j),
Hˆi(u¯
)+ ∑
j∈G/ j 6=i
Hˆ j(c j) ≤ Hˆi(u¯)+ ∑j∈G′/ j 6=i
Hˆ j(c j),
i.e. SˆG(u¯
,c−i) ≤ SˆG′(u¯ ,c−i).
if i 6∈G′ then, since Hˆi is increasing, we have Hˆi(u¯)≤ Hˆi(u¯) and therefore SˆG(u¯ ,c−i)≤
SˆG(u¯,c−i).
Because i 6∈ G′ we have SˆG′(.,c−i) constant ; and from SˆG(u¯,c−i) ≤ SˆG′(u¯,c−i), we
deduce SˆG(u¯,c−i)≤ SˆG′(u¯ ,c−i) and then SˆG(u¯ ,c−i)≤ SˆG′(u¯ ,c−i).
this shows that SˆG(u¯
,c−i) = min
{
SˆG′(u¯
,c−i) : G′ ∈R
}
, i.e. G ∈ AR(u
¯
,c−i).
Now we will show that AR(u
¯
,c−i)⊂ AR(u¯,c−i). Take any G0 ∈ AR(u¯ ,c−i).
- if i∈G0 then, from SˆG(u¯ ,c−i) = SˆG0(u¯ ,c−i) we deduce SˆG(u¯,c−i) = SˆG0(u¯,c−i) i.e.
G0 ∈ AR(u¯,c−i).
- if i 6∈ G0 then SˆG0(.,c−i) is constant,
SˆG0(u¯,c−i) = SˆG0(u¯
,c−i)
= SˆG(u¯
,c−i) (because G,G0 ∈ AR(u¯ ,c−i) )
≤ SˆG(u¯,c−i) (because Hˆi is increasing and i ∈ G).
So we also have G0 ∈ AR(u¯,c−i).
Proof of lemma 5. Fix i ∈N , G ∈R : i ∈ G, c−i ∈ Γ−i and u¯ , u¯ ∈ Γi :u¯< u¯.
We know there are only two cases : either G 6∈ AR(u¯,c−i) or G ∈ AR(u¯,c−i).
(i) Suppose G 6∈ AR(u¯,c−i) ; then by definition qRG (u¯,c−i) = 0≤ qRG (u¯ ,c−i).
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(ii) Suppose G ∈ AR(u¯,c−i) then, by lemma 4, AR(u¯ ,c−i)⊂ A
R(u¯,c−i);
as a consequence |AR(u
¯
,c−i)| ≤ |AR(u¯,c−i)|. Now if SˆG(u¯,c−i)> v then qRG (u¯,c−i)=
0≤ qRG (u¯ ,c−i). If SˆG(u¯,c−i)≤ v then, because Hˆi is increasing and i∈G, SˆG(u¯ ,c−i)≤ v.
Therefore qRG (u¯
,c−i) = 1|AR(u
¯
,c−i)| ≥
1
|AR(u¯,c−i)| = q
R
G (u¯,c−i).
(i) and (ii) imply that qRG (.,c−i) is decreasing. Hence x
R
i (.,c−i) = ∑
G∈R/i∈G
qRG (.,c−i)
and XRi (.) = E
[
xRi (.,c−i)
]
are decreasing.
Proof of lemma 6.
pi0(q, t)− pˆi0(q, t) =
∫
Γ
{
∑
i∈N
Hˆi(ci)xi(c)
}
f (c)dc−
∫
Γ
{
∑
i∈N
Hi(ci)xi(c)
}
f (c)dc,
= ∑
i∈N
∫
Γ
{
Hˆi(ci)−Hi(ci)
}
xi(c) f (c)dc,
= ∑
i∈N
∫ c¯i
c
¯i
{
Hˆi(ci)−Hi(ci)
}
Xi(ci) f (ci)dci (using (3.4)),
= ∑
i∈N
∫ c¯i
c
¯i
{
Kˆ′i (Fi(ci))−K′i (Fi(ci))
}
Xi(ci) f (ci)dci (by definition of Hi and Hˆi),
= ∑
i∈N
∫ c¯i
c
¯i
{
(Kˆi ◦Fi)′(ci)− (Ki ◦Fi)′(ci)
}
Xi(ci)dci .
Integrating by part,
pi0(q, t)− pˆi0(q, t) = ∑
i∈N
{
(Kˆi ◦Fi)(c¯i)− (Ki ◦Fi)(c¯i)− (Kˆi ◦Fi)(c¯i)+(Ki ◦Fi)(c¯i)
}
−
∫ c¯i
c
¯i
{
(Kˆi ◦Fi)(ci)− (Ki ◦Fi)(ci)
}
dXi(ci),
= ∑
i∈N
{
Kˆi(1)−Ki(1)− Kˆi(0)+Ki(0)
}
−
∫ c¯i
c
¯i
{
(Kˆi ◦Fi)(ci)− (Ki ◦Fi)(ci)
}
dXi(ci), (II.3)
Finally, using property (a) :
pi0(q, t)− pˆi0(q, t) =− ∑
i∈N
∫ c¯i
c
¯i
{
Kˆi(Fi(ci))−Ki(Fi(ci))
}
dXi(ci) (II.4)
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Since the mechanism is IC, proposition 13 implies that dXi(ci) ≤ 0. Furthermore
property (b) implies Kˆi(Fi(ci))−Ki(Fi(ci)) ≤ 0. It follows that pi0(q, t)− pˆi0(q, t) ≤ 0.
proof of Theorem 2. - First, we prove that (qR , tR) is IR. By definition tRi (m) ≥
xRi (m)mi and (integrating over m−i ) TRi (mi)≥XRi (mi)mi, i.e. piRi (mi)≥ 0. So (qR , tR)
is IR.
- Next, we prove that (qR , tR) is IC. Using the definition of tR : tRi (c) = xRi (c)ci+∫ c¯i
ci x
R
i (u,c−i)du,
and integrating this equality over c−i leads to TRi (ci) = XRi (ci)ci+
∫ c¯i
ci X
R
i (u,c−i)du.
Since piRi (c¯i, c¯i) = TRi (c¯i)−XRi (c¯i)c¯i = 0, we conclude
TRi (ci) = T
R
i (c¯i)−XRi (c¯i)c¯i+XRi (ci)ci+
∫ c¯i
ci
XRi (u,c−i)du.
lemma 5 shows XRi is decreasing. By proposition 13 we may conclude that (qR , tR)
is IC.
- Finally, we prove that pi0(q, t) ≤ pi0(qR , tR) for any IC and IR constrained me-
chanism (q, t).
Let (q, t) be anR-constrained mechanism IC and IR. Recall that
pˆi0(q, t) =− ∑
i∈N
pii(c¯i, c¯i)+
∫
Γ
{
∑
G∈P
qG(c)(v− SˆG(c))
}
f (c)dc.
Remark 1 shows that − ∑
i∈N
pii(c¯i, c¯i)≤− ∑
i∈N
piRi (c¯i, c¯i).
Because (q, t) isR-constrained,
∑
G∈P
qG(c)(v− SˆG(c))= ∑
G∈R
qG(c)(v− SˆG(c))= (1− ∑
G∈R
qG(c)).0+ ∑
G∈R
qG(c)(v− SˆG(c)).
(II.5)
This is a weighted mean of the sequence
{
0,
(
(v− SˆG(c))
)
G∈R
}
, and we have :
xxi
∑
G∈P
qG(c)(v− SˆG(c)) ≤ max
{
0,
(
(v− SˆG(c))
)
G∈R
}
= ∑
G∈R
qRG (c)(v− SˆG(c)) (by construction)
= ∑
G∈P
qRG (c)(v− SˆG(c)).
Since c is arbitrary we conclude that
∫
Γ
{
∑
G∈P
qG(c)(v− SˆG(c))
}
f (c)dc≤
∫
Γ
{
∑
G∈P
qRG (c)(v− SˆG(c))
}
f (c)dc,
and pˆi0(q, t)≤ pˆi0(qR , tR). Putting this with lemma 6 gives pi0(q, t)≤ pˆi0(qR , tR). It
will be sufficient to show that pˆi0(qR , tR) = pi0(qR , tR).
Since (qR , tR) is IC, equation (II.4) (in appendix) applies :
pˆi0(qR , tR)−pi0(qR , tR) = ∑
i∈N
∫ c¯i
c
¯i
{
Kˆi(Fi(ci))−Ki(Fi(ci))
}
dXRi (ci);
If Kˆi(Fi(ci))−Ki(Fi(ci)) 6= 0 then Kˆi(Fi(ci))−Ki(Fi(ci))< 0 and Hˆi(ci) is constant in
some neighborhood of ci (property (c)) and so, XRi (ci) is also constant
1 (i.e. dXRi (ci) =
0) in some neighborhood of ci.We then conclude
∫ c¯i
c
¯i
{
Kˆi(Fi(ci))−Ki(Fi(ci))
}
dXRi (ci)=
0 and pˆi0(qR , tR)−pi0(qR , tR) = 0.
- Moreover the expected surplus is :
1.
Recall XRi (c1) =
∫
Γ−i x
R
i (ci,c−i) f−i(c−i)dc−i and
xRi (ci,c−i) = ∑
G∈P/i∈G
qRG (ci,c−i); this sum depends only on the ironed out virtual costs Hˆi(ci) and
(Hˆ j(c j)) j 6=i. Because the integral is taken over c−i, we conclude that XRi (ci) depends only on the functions
(Hˆ j) j 6=i and on Hˆi(ci) ; thus it is constant if Hˆi(ci) is constant.
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ρR(v) = pi0(qR , tR) = pˆi0(qR , tR) =− ∑
i∈N
piRi (c¯i, c¯i)+
∫
Γ
{
∑
G∈R
qRG (c)SˆG(c)
}
f (c)dc
= 0+
∫
Γ
max
{
0,
(
(v− SˆG(c))
)
G∈R
}
f (c)dc
= E
[
max
{
0,
(
(v− SˆG(c))
)
G∈R
}]
.
proof of proposition 14. Fix an item l ∈ {1,2, ...,L}, a supplier of that item i ∈ Il and a
report vector m ∈Γ.
- Suppose i 6∈ Al(m) ; there exists j ∈ Il : Hˆi(mi)> Hˆ j(m j).
Consider some list G ∈P :i ∈ G and let G′ = G∪{ j}−{i}. In the list G′ supplier
j is awarded the contract for item l instead of i as in G, but suppliers of the other items
remain the same.
We have
SˆG′(m) = SˆG(m)+ Hˆ j(m j)− Hˆi(mi)< SˆG(c).
This means that G 6∈ A(m) and therefore qPG (m) = 0. Since G is an arbitrary list inP
such that i ∈ G, we conclude
xPi (m) = ∑
G∈P/i∈G
qPG (m) = 0.
- Now suppose that i ∈ Al(m) ; we now know that ∑
j∈Al(m)
xPj (m) = ∑
j∈Il
xPj (m). We
first show that suppliers in Al(m) have the same probability to win, i.e. xPi (m) = xPj (m)
for any j ∈ Al(m).
Let j∈Al(m) ; then Hˆ j(m j)= Hˆi(mi). The map λ : {G ∈P : i ∈ G}→{G ∈P : j ∈ G} ,
G 7→ G∪{ j}−{i} is a bijection. Moreover, for any G ∈P : i ∈ G ,
Sˆλ (G)(m) = SˆG(m)+ Hˆ j(m j)− Hˆi(mi) = SˆG(c).
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Thus G ∈ A(m) if and only if λ (G) ∈ A(m). This means qPG (m) = qPλ (G)(m). It follows
that :
xPj (m) = ∑
G′∈P/ j∈G′
qPG′ (m) = ∑
G∈P/i∈G
qPλ (G)(m) = ∑
G∈P/i∈G
qPG (m) = x
P
i (m).
Therefore
xPi (m) =
∑
j∈Il
xPj (m)
|Al(m)| .
The result follows from the fact that the probability to purchase an item is
∑
j∈Il
xPj (m) = ∑
G∈P
qPG (m) = 1(minG∈P
SˆG(m)≤ v).
